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FOREWORD 
" For more than fifteen years~ America has drifted deeper 
and deeper into inflation, until tod~ our whole econo-
mic~ social and political system is infected with an in-
flationary mentality and we are approaching a point where 
the foundations of our economic and social structure are 
threatened•"* 
This statement of "Dr . G. C. iegand might seem slightly axag-
gerated to European minds accustomed to think of the dollar as a sta-
ble and strong currency; an average price rise of 2.2% a year for the 
1947-1957 period seems modest when compared to average price increa-
ses of 4.7% in England and 6.2% in France during the same period. It 
is true, nonetheless~ that~ in ten years, the dollar has lost about 
20% of its value and this at the expense of the saving public. 
Dr.Wiegand's reasoning follows the same line: in the year 
1956, life-insurance policies, savings deposits, time deposits, s~ 
vings capital of Savings and Loans Associations and saving bonds out-
standing added up to $570 billions. (For our purpose~ we might add to 
Dr.Wiegand•s listing such fixed-d~bt securities as industrial bonds 
and preferred stocks.) ~ing the same year, a 2.8% depreciation of 
the monetary unit brought the value of these savings dow.n b.r almost 
$16 billions. Hence, more than 80% of the $19 billions increase in 
personal income recorded for that year was, in fact, due to ttexpro-
priation of one segment of the population by another. 
It is not our purpose here to investigate the causes of 
this inflationar.y wave nor to scan all its social and political con-
* 60~ p.412 
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sequences; w~ only want to point out the possible disruptions it may 
introduce into the capital market, and indicate what value the study 
of an extreme case, that of the French post-war inflation, m~ have 
for an American analyst. 
Twice in the recent past, in the summer of 1957 for a short 
time and in the tall of 1958 for almost three months, the American 
securities market was puzzled b.r sudden distortions in the familiar 
relationship between the yields on common stocks and high-grade bonds. 
On these two occasions stock prices rose so high and bond prices fell 
so markedly that high-grade bonds ended by yielding more than common 
stocks. In 1958 the difference widened to more than one half of one 
percentage point. 
Commentators differed in their interpretation of this phe-
nomenon. Some attributed it to an exceptionally bullish stock-market 
discounting the future high earnings of American industry; in 1929, 
heavy speculation in stocks had brought about a similar result. Others 
laid the blame on the taxation s,ystem which compelled firms to finance 
their operation through debt rather than equity, thus inflating the 
supply of bonds ·and holding down that of common stocks with all logi-
cal consequences for the prices and yields of both. At the same time 
high rates of personal income-tax. induced investors to bid up the 
stock of some so-called n growth industries" that retain earnings ins-
tead of paying them out in dividends am to hold onto tmm, once ac-
quired, for fear of the capital gains tax. 
All these factors are certainlY important and their combi-
nation might be sufficient to explain the new relationship in the 
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yields of securities; yet, should the inflation factor be entirely 
disregarded? s~e would do so. Inflation curbs are unpopular in this 
country where, after decades of monetary stability, the evils of "all-
out" inflation have been forgotten and are consequently minimized in 
comparison to the unemployment and recession many think a policy of 
monetary stability might produce. 
Commenting upon the above-mentioned change in the yield re-
lationship, a chronicler of the "New York Times" wrote: 
n The choice of inflation as a scape-goat is troublesome be-
cause the "inflation" referred to is not inflation in the 
economic sense - that is money supply become excess1 ve in 
relation to the aggregate of goods produced and services 
exchanged. The inflation spoken of so glibly is rather a 
catch-all concept invoked to cover the growing willingness 
of the public to go into debt, the power of labor to bar-
gain for higher wages, the tendency of prices to rise and 
the bend of government bodies to incur budget deficits that 
have to be financed, if not from the public's savings, then 
from connnercial banks."* 
The author's contention is that such influences do create an 
"inflationary atmosphere", but they cannot bring about inflation in 
and by themselves unless the money supply is, at the same time, swol-
len excessively; and the Federal Reserve has proved, in its past ac-
tiona, its determination to stand for the maintenance of "honest moneytJ . 
One might object to such subtle distinctions. "economic" or not, the 
current inflation is reflected in the gradual loss of purchasing power 
of the dollar and this is, really, what we are interested in. As for 
the stability of Federal Reserve monetary liabilities, it does not tell 
the whole story, and an increase in commercial bank credit or even in 
* 70, p.25. 
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the velocity of money can produce inflation in spite of all; or else, 
where would the gradual rise in all price indices come from? 
Even if we deny the "fact" of inflation, we must ask ourselves 
if the "fear" of it, this "inflationary mentalitY" mentioned by our au-
thor, cannot be, in itself, a cause for some disruptions in the securi-
ties market. nr.Bogen wrote in October of 1957: 
" The chief threat to a bright economic future is not so much 
inflation as a general belief that inflation is inevitable. 
Then, people should put their savings into equi.ty and real 
estate, business should buy aU the plant, and equipment, 
and inventory it can order since, every year you delay, it 
will cost you so much more . "* 
For fear of capital losses, investors sey away from fixed-debt 
securities and concentrate on common stock with the hope that higher pri-
ces for the company's products will result in higher earnings and these, 
in turn, will push stock prices parallel to the cost of 1i ving. In so 
doing, they contribute to the bul1ishness of the stock-market. On the 
contrary borrowers,alreaqy attracted towards bond financing due to its 
tax advantages find in it a new appeal as they hope to pay back the bor-
rowed funds in a depreciated currency. The increased volume of their is-
sues aggravates the bearishness of the bond-market. 
In short 1 even i.f we admit that one must look beyond inflation 
to explain the recent developments in the securities market, nobody can 
deny that the current uncertainty as to the future of the currency is one 
of the many factors underlying all investment decisions. Assuming a per-
sistent average price-increase of 2. 2% a year, the present-day investor 
of $100 would find his capital reduced, after thirty years . by more than 
* 65, 
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one half of its original purchasing power; is the investing public 
blind enough to over.Look this danger when deciding upon the use it 
will make of its funds? 
The firmness of a bond .. market depends, to a very great ex-
tent, upon the faith investors have in the future of the currency. 
The French experience of the post- war years is a case in point and 
it should serve as an argument for all those who advocate monetary 
stability. 
- 1.3-
Introduction 
There are three objectives to any investment: the 
conservation of the invested capital; the earning of an income and the 
hope for some capital gain. 
Speaking of debt securities, the third objective tends to 
give precedence to the other two . This does not mean that bondholders 
cannot hope for an appreciation of their capital; but such an appreciation 
is not, generally, their man consideration. The bond market attracts the 
more conservative element of the investing public and the French 11 rentier 11 
was not an exception to the rule; his main objective was to earn an income 
during his active life then to recover his capital which would support him 
in his old age or be transmitted intact to his heirs . His investment policy 
was very much oriented towards safety and this conservative spirit explained 
his preference for government issues -- foreign or national -- reputedly 
less risky than industrial securities . Safety of capital and stability 
of income were his main concern; as for capital gains, they came to him, 
more or less, as an unexpected bonus . 
Investors are, naturally, much more concerned with the 
stability of their capital and income in terms of purchasing power than 
with their stability in terms of monetary units. For this reason, the 
enduring inflation that followed the second world war had a devastating 
impact upon the French bond market. The endless depreciation of the franc 
drove investors, away from fixed-income securities, towards other types of 
investments . Many stopped saving altogether and their increased rate of 
expenditure aggravated the inflationary pressures. 
-~ 
By 1952 the bond market, once an important source of funds 
for the Government, had been reduced to a trickle. At the same time the 
State budget was swollen by all the expenditures necessary to rebuild 
and modernize the economy and finance the operation of nationalized 
industries which State-ownership had barred from using equity funds. In 
spite of high tax rates, budgetary deficits were thus increasing from year 
to year. For lack of private savings, they had to be financed through 
foreign loands or gifts and through monetary inflation. Foreign aid could 
only be a temporary solution to the problem; as for inflation, it was no 
solution at all; on the contrary, it aggravated the situation by increasing 
the public 1 s reluctance to save and to invest in fixed-income securities. 
French finances were caught in a vicious circle. Some guaranty had to be 
devised which would protect French investors against the depreciation of 
their capital and attract them again to the bond market. 
Finding its inspiration in the practices of some foreign 
borrowers who had faced -- or were facing -- the same problems , the Pinay 
Government floated , in 1952, the first important French issue of 11 indexed 
bonds". The success of this issue paved the way for many others and 
indexed bonds became, from 1952 to 1958, an important source of funds for 
the Government and for nationalized firms. Threatened with eviction from 
the bond-market unless they could meet the competition of public borro'iJers, 
private firms followed their example; restricted in their use of indexation 
clauses by legal considerations, they adopted some formulas in use in anglo-
saxon countries: participating and convertible bonds. 
Chapter I will follow the evolution of French inflation 
throughout the postwar period and show its impact upon the bond market; 
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Chapter II will describe some o£ the securities issued by French bor-
rowers in an attempt to attract more private £unds into this market . Both 
chapters have borrowed extensively £rom a book published in 1957 by M. 
Olivier Moreau-Neret and entitled 11 Les Valeurs Francaises depuis 194o" 
( French Securities since 194o). President of 11 Credit Lyonnais 11 , one of 
France's £our great commercial banks, M. Moreau-Neret was also President 
of a Commission specially appointed by the Ydnister of Finances to study 
the problems o£ the French capital market and present suggestions -- which 
were later incorporated in several £inancial laws. He thus took an active 
share in the making of this history which he relates. His book is an 
invaluable source of in£ormation and statistics £or all the students of 
the French capital market . 
The second part of our £irst chapter, which describes the 
evolution o£ the bond market since the beginning o£ the second world war 
is, in £act, a mere condensation o£ the last part of M. Moreau-Neret 1 s work . 
Its inclusion in this thesis seemed justi£ied inasmuch as it provided the 
reader with the best introduction possible to the subject . 
I£ events had £ollowed the course which seemed to be set 
£or them in 1956, when the book was written, there would have been nothing 
to add to M. Moreau-Neret 1 s authoritative analysis. But a£ter four years 
o£ relative stability in£lation flared up again in 1957 and led, in April 
1958, to one o£ the most severe £inancial crises France had ever known . 
The purpose of our last chapters will be to study indexed bonds in the light 
of these recent developments,· see how well they withstood the test o£ in-
flation and determine whether they were not, to some extent, responsible 
for the seriousness of the final crisis. 
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I. INFLATION IN FRANCE SINCE 1940 
ITS ll1PACT UPON PRIVATE SAVINGS 
AND UPON THE SECURITIES MARKET 
A. Inflation and the depreciation of the French franc. 
Inflation, in itself, can be a subject for endless dis-
putes; experts will disagree as to its causes, character and even vo-
lume. Our concern here is not with inflation itself but with its ulti-
mate conseq~ences for the purchasing power of the monetar,y unit. The 
depreciation of the franc during the years 1938-1958 can be studied 
from two points of view: from the internal point of view, as reflected 
in constant price rises within the national. boundaries, and from the 
international point of view, that is, relative to other more stable 
currencies . 
1. The internal aspect. 
In the country itself, the proportions of the inflatio-
nary movement are reflected in an almost uninterrupted rise of all pri-
ce indices. The I.N.S.E .E. (National Institute of Statistics and Eco-
nomic Studies) publishes several indices that are useful in getting a 
measure of the monetar.y depreciation; among them: 
- an index of wholesale prices. 
- an index of retail prices . 
These two indices have been reproduced in Exhibit I. 
Both are weighted averages of the price of certain selected commodities. , 
the basis for calculation has changed over the years, so as to take i~ 
to account various changes in the national economic structures and the 
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introduction of new products in the market; yet, conversion rates have 
been established between the different series of indices, which makes 
it possible to follow, without interruption, price changes back to 1938. 
Exhibit I . 
Wholesale and retail )rice indices 
(19jS:l9Stl 
1938: 100 
Yearly Wholesale Retail 
Average Prices Prices 
1938 100 100 
1939 105 108 
1940 139 129 
1941 171 150 
1942 201 175 
1943 234 224 
1944 264 285 
1945 375 393 
1946 648 645 
1947 989 1,030 
1948 1,712 1,632 
1949 1,917 1,817 
1950 2,166 1,945 
1951 2,651 2,279 
1952 2,778 2,464 
1953 2,651 2,42o 
1954 2,6o5 2,402 
1955 2,601 2,429 
1956 2,714 2,475 
1957 2,807 ~,567 
1958 3,199 2,985 
Source: Institut National de la Statistique. 
mean of 
the two 
averages 
100 
106 
134 
161 
188 
229 
275 
384 
647 
1,010 
1,672 
1,867 
2,056 
2,465 
2,621 
2,535 
2,503 
2,515 
2,594 
2,687 
3,092 
It will be seen that the two indices of retail and whole-
sale prices, while moving along similar lines, do sometimes reflect in-
fluences particular to each: wholesale prices are more sensitive to eco-
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nomic fluctuations; retail prices are more sluggish, reflecting the 
relative inelasticity of the wages incorporated in them. As shown in 
the third column of the exhibit, the average of the two indices can 
be used as the best available measure of monetar.y depreciation. 
In an effort to interpret, rou~, these price movements 
over the years, it is possible to distinguish more or less four pha-
ses in the period under study. 
a. 1938-1945. 
This period corresponds to the first years of the se-
cond World-War and comprises the four years of German occupation. 
Inflation got under way in the years 1939-1940 w.i. th the first war bud-
gets only partially covered by revenues from taxation. The movement 
accelerated during the years of Gennan occupation and is imperfectly 
reflected in the above indices which were established on the basis of 
controlled prices. In fact, as the rationing of commodities became mo-
. 
re and more severe, the public was obliged to resort to the black mar-
ket, and expenditures ran far above the official prices. At the same 
time, the payment of "occupation expenses" to Germany had to be finan-
ced through direct advances from the Bank of France to the Treasury 
and grossly inflated the money supply. From 1940 to 1944, f.859 billions 
were issued for this purpose. This monetary inflation was going to pl~ 
an important part during the post-war years by putting a heavy pressu-
re on the price structure. From the Liberation of Paris to the end of 
World-War II, military expenditures caused another unbalanced budget, 
with tax revenues covering only 42% of Government expenditures in 1945. 
From 1948 to 1945, the franc had lost 74% of its purcha-
sing power. 
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b. 1945-1952. 
These are the years of reconstruction. Through various 
bond issues and exceptional taxes, succesive Cabinets attempted to 
absorb some of the excess of purchasing power created during the war 
years. This effort proved unsuccessful; moreover, the necessit,y of re-
building the industrial potential of the nation, and the difficulties 
encountered in trying to attract private savings towards this use made_ 
it necess~ to .include many investment expenses in the State budgets. 
High tax rates could not bring enough funds to meet all the urgent 
needs that were faced, and the Treasury was obliged to resort once mo-
re to inflation. A lengthy war in Indochina and the heavy military ex-
penses it entailed further aggravated the defi cits of the budgets. 
Exhibit II shows the proportion of Government expenditures covered by 
taxation during the years under stu4y. It deals separatelY with ordina-
ry expenses, incurred for the current operation of the various servi-
ces, and extraordinary expenses, meaning those expenses w:P.ich are in 
the nature of long-term investments and are supposed to pay for them-
selves. This distinction is customary in French budgetary practices; 
the idea behind it is that, in the case of the State like in the case 
of a business enterprise, current expenses must be met with current 
income -i.e. taxation- while the financing of investment expenditures 
through borrowing is perfectly justified. Exhibit II gives evidence 
of the fact that, in spite of high tax levies, taxation was not even 
sufficient to cover the ordinary expenses in all the years; one can 
easilY imagine the effect of such deficits on the money supply. 
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Exhibit II 
Percentage of Government ~enditures 
financed through taxation 
1945=1952 
Tax receipts as a % of 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 
1) Ordinary expenses 52 78 97 101 107 ll8 
2) Extraordinary ex-
penses (after ordinary 4 14 40 
expenses have been met) 
3) Total budgetary 
expenses. 42 54 69 64 70 77 
1951 19$2 
llO 96 
33 
81 75 
Source: Report of the Economic Council. Quoted in "Les Valeurs 
Francaises depuis 19401' (NO 1 in bibliography.) 
In many cases, the rationing of commodities was aban-
doned too soon and private demand for consumption goods, pent up du-
rin~ the war years, was allowed to compete with the demand for recons-
truction. As a consequence, there was a constant increase in prices, 
wage am price increases following each other in an endless process. 
By 19521 the franc had lost 86% of its 1944 purchasing 
power or 96% of its 1938 purchasing power. 
c. 1952-1956. 
Tb year 1952 was a turning point in the history of 
post-war inflation. Commentators will argue about the cause of the 
stabilization. Some will say that it was under way long before the co-
ming to power of the Pinay Gabinet in Karch of 1952. In any case, it 
seems that the new tendency was largely due to psychological reasons 
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and to the apparent efforts of the Govermnent to put an end to infla-
tion. Budgetary expenses and tax rates were kept stable and the pu-
blic's renewed confidence in the future of the currency made it possi-
ble to finance a greater share of investment expenses through private 
savings. A minimum wage law was voted which provided for wage increa-
ses parallel to increases in the price index. This compelled the Go-
vernment to keep an eye on the price situation especially concerning 
the commodities included in the calculation of the price index. In the 
last months of 1955 and all through 1956 artificial devices had to be 
used to keep the index from rising over the critical point: l) subsi-
dies to producers enabled these to keep prices down. 2) Government im-
ports were used to put downward pressure on the prices of certain com-
modities. In general~ however, the stabilization efforts had proved 
successful and the purchasing power of the franc had remained practical-
ly unchanged throughout the period. 
d. Since 1956 
A new wave of inflation surged in 1957. Like the slight 
price rise observed since 1955 it was ma~ due to the militar,y expen-
ses incurred in the Algerian war and to new investment outlays which 
were necessar,r to prepare the French economy for its entrance into the 
European Common Market. But~ as soon as the Government had to abandon 
the line to which it had held desperately during the past two years~ all 
its defences were rapidly overwheihmed and France headed far one of the 
most severe financial crises it had ever experienced. In 1957 alone, di-
rect advances from the Bank of France to the Treasury amounted to 
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f .452 billions. The combination of falling exports and of a serious 
run on the franc exhausted the reserves of foreign currencies and 
the Government was once more obliged to ask for foreign loans. It was 
at that moment that the dissidence of Algerian settlers and the threat 
of a civil war overthrew the Fourth Republic and brought General de 
Gaulle back to power, in May 1958. Until the end of that year, the car-
rying out of political reforms and the preparation of a new Constitu-
tion left little time to deal with the financial problems. Besides, the 
new Government was confronted with expenses which had already been en-
gaged and its freedom of action was therefore limited. It is only in 
December that General de Gaulle and his Minister of Finances, .Antoine 
Pinay (architect of the 1952 stabilization) outlined an austerity pro-
gram intended to restore monetar,y stability. 
Between 1956 and 1958, the franc had lost about 16% of 
its purchasing power. 
2. The international aspect. 
The depreciation of the franc in the domestic economY 
was bound to be reflected in its exchange value relative to other, more 
stable currencies, eapecial:cy the dollar. The difficulty is to find fi-
gures representative o:f the true relationship. The various controls es-
tablished over international p~ents during the post-war years make 
official exchange rates, shown in Exhibit III, somewhat unrealistic. 
Lack of convertibility, general control over transactions and rationing 
of foreign exchange sold through a government agen~ and for authorized 
purposes only set a protective barrier around the franc and did not per-
mit it to face the full pressure of demand and supply. 
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Exhibit III 
Official Exchange Rate 
of dollars into francs (1938-1959) 
1938 : ••••••• •••••••• f • 
1939 : •••••••••••••••• f. 
1944 : •••••••••••.•••• r. 
Dec. 26, 1945 : ....... f. 
Jan. 261 1948 : ....... f . 
Oct. 171 1948 : ....... f. 
Apr. 271 1948 : ....... r. 
Sept.20, 1949 : ....... r. 
Aug. 101 19 57 : ....... f. 
Dec. 291 1958 : ....... f. 
34.95 
39.81 
49.625 
119.106 
214.392 
263.4 
272. 
350. 
420. 
493.70 
Source: "L'Agence Economique et Financiere."l2/29/58 
Accompanied by the reestablishment of external conver-
tibility, the devaluation of December 1958 certainly made the official 
exchange rate to correspond more to facts. This convertibility is, howe-
ver, incomplete- not being applicable to French nationalttt -and that com-
mercial transactions are still subject to such limitations as tariffs 
and quotas . While even the so-called "free market" was closely control-
led and somewhat managed by French authorities, its quotations of the 
dollar 1 shown in Exhibit JY 1 might well be the best available measure 
of the international depreciation of the franc. Taking into account the 
decrease in purchasing power of the dollar itself, we find that, during 
the period 1938-1956 period, the franc depreciated by 82%; this result 
is :fair]J' close to the one obtained through the study o:f internal depre-
ciation: ti6%. 
* 101 P• 1 
1938 : .•........• 
1941 : ............ 
1942 : •......•... 
1943 : •.........• 
1944 : •.•......•. 
1945 : •...•....•. 
1946 =··········· 1947 : ••.......•• 
1948 
=··········· 1949 •••••••••••• 
1950 : •......•.•• 
1951 
=··········· 1952 : •.•......•. 
1953 : •.•......•. 
1954 : ........... 
1955 : ........... 
1956 : •....•...•. 
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Exhibit rl 
Free EKchan~ Rate 
of dollars iii francs (193S:1956) 
Apprecia- u.s. 
Exchange tion of price-index 
Rate $ relati- 1938: 100 
ve to f . (1) 
34.95 
146 4. 2 1~09 
173 4. 9 1. 23 
189 5. 4 1 . 29 
223 6.4 1. 30 
158 4~ 5 1~33 
293 8.4 1. 50 
271 7 ~8 1~ 81 
391 u .. 2 1. 96 
389 ll.1 1~87 
315 10.7 1~94 
398 ll.l~ 2 ~ 14 
415 ll. 9 2.10 
400 ll. 4 2. 09 
369 10.5 2.10 
372 10. 6 2. 10 
391 11.3 . 2.15 
(1) Average of wholesale and retail price-indices . 
Apprecia.-
tion of $ 
relative to 
! . (adjusted 
for deprecia-
tion of $. 
4. 6 
6.1 
7 
8.3 
6 
12. 6 
14 " 
21~9 
20. 8 
20~6 
24.4 
24. 9 
23 . 9 
22 .1 
22.3 
24.4 
Source: Institut National de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques. 
"Annuaire Statistique de la France" . Historique p.87. 
B. Inflation and the French bond-market. * 
A quick glance at Chart I and Exhibit V will lead to two 
conclusions: First, the price o£ debt securities fell markedly during the 
* 1, pp. 679-726. 
170 
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I 
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Chart I 
Fixed-income securities prices (193S:1956) 
General index of bond prices (1938: 100) 
Market price of the 3% Rente. 
f I I I I I I I I I I i I I I i I i I SO I 
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Source: o. Moreau-Neret "Les ValetU"s ~ancaises depuis 194011 p.27 
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post-war years as shown in the movements of the general index and tho-
se of one particular govermnent bond~ the 3% "Rente11 (a debt with no ma-
turi ty date . ) 
Second, tha volume of bond issues fell to a level well 
below that of the prewar yearsJ The figures in Exhibit V have all been 
converted into 1938 francs in order to make the comparison possible . 
Years 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Exhibi t V 
Intermediate- term 
and l ong- term borrowings 
(billions of 1938 francs) 
Government Other Public Private 
Borrowers Borrowers 
4. 7 0. 28 2. 7 
none none 1. 0 
6.1 5. 6 0.3 
1. 5 8. 2 1. 6 
18. 6 2.3 1. 9 
49. 8 o. 6 1. 9 
none 3. 2 5. 1 
none 6.1 2. 5 
%lone 2.3 1.1 
6. 5 2. 5 0.4 
5. 8 1. 0 o.5 
0.3 3. 7 0.5 
none 1. 7 0.4 
8.3 1. 7 0.3 
2.1 4. 3 0.9 
4.4 6 . L~ 1. 8 
3.4 5.0 3.5 
16.3 5. 8 2. 8 
Total 
7. 68 
1. 00 
12. 00 
11.30 
23.00 
52 . 30 
8. 30 
8. 6o 
3.40 
9. 40 
7. 30 
4.50 
2.10 
10.30 
7. 30 
12 . 6o 
11. 90 
24. 90 
Source: 0. Moreau-Neret . "Les Valeurs Francaises depuis 
1940" p. 581 Paris1 Sirey, 1957. 
There cannot be the slightest doubt as to "the relation-
ship between inflation and this decadence of the French bond-market. 
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A striking proof of such a relationship is to be found in the trend re-
versal that followed the monetar,r stabilization of 1952. But, at the 
same time, independant variations in the demand for and supply of secu-
rities came into pl~. Sometimes they offset, sometimes they exaggerated 
the effect of inflation; they must be mentioned brief~ if a clear idea 
is to be gained of the evolution of the bond-market since the pre-war 
period. 
1. From 1939 to 1945. 
The significant rise observed in the prices of fixed-inco-
me securities during this period seems to contradict the idea of an inver-
se relationship between inflation and the popularity of such securities. 
This paradox is, in fact , explained by the special conditions of supply 
and demand which existed at the time. 
a. The demand for securities. 
During those years, the combination of several factors had 
greatly swollen the supply or loanable funds: 
- First, the repatriation, in 1939, of some or the French capital 
that had been invested abroad. 
- Second, the heavy budgetar,y deficits incurred by the Government, 
first for military purposes, then, far the p~ent of "occupation 
expenses" to Germany. 
* The Treasury's retirement of its outstanding debt, as it matured. 
Due to the scarcity of consumers goods, as well as of pro-
ducers goods, the funds thus added to the money supp~ increased the li-
quidity position or the public, including industrial and commercial firms. 
For lack or other uses, they were invested in the securities market. 
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b. '1he supply of sec uri ties . 
Private demand for funds was limited by lack of invest-
ment opportunities . The Government itself saw many of its expenses re-
duced because of shortages in the securities market. Consequent~, hol-
ders of loanable funds could only bid up the prices of existing secu-
rities and of whatever new ones were issued. The result was a sharp ri-
se of securities prices during the war years. 
This rise was, in fact, so pronounced that many borrowers 
found it advantageous to call their outstanding debts and to refund them 
with n~ issues carrying lower interest rates; interest rates on Gover~ 
ment bonds fell from 6% in 1939 to 3% to 4% in 1945. 
In short, from 1939 t o 1945, the conditions of supply and 
demand in the bond-market had to some extent offset the effects of infla-
tion. However, in spite of this exceptionally high demand, the rise in 
bond prices was far from matching that in commodities prices as can be 
seen in Chart II. 
~ After 1945. 
After the war laS over, the conditions of supply and de-
mand on the bond-market were reversed} they exaggerated the impact of in--
flationary pressures instead of offsetting it. 
a. The demand for securities. 
The volume of loanable funds decreased sharply under the 
influence of various factors: 
First, the return to post-war conditions brought about an 
increase in private consumption and, consequently, a decrease in savings; 
4 
pent-up during the preceding years, the demand for consumption goods was 
Cll 
-- -- j - Chart II -------.. -~ co~ared variations of the general Erice ~e~ () aiii o'l tne ::lnCiex o"l oond Erice s (1) L 4oo m 400 I t l93S:1945) I .. 
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finally set free by the loosening of official rationing. Far from sa-
ving, people got into debt; they bought on credit, realizing that, in 
times of inflation, the position of a debtor is far better than that 
of a creditor. 
The contribution of institutional investors to the capi-
tal market decreased also: 
Life Insurance companies experienced difficulties in at-
tracting funds (Exhibit VI) . 1he Social Security plan bad reduced the 
need for insurame, and the public was tired of contributing to policies 
which lost value rapidly as inflation progressed. 
For the same reason, public and private pension funds had 
stopped capitalizing the funds that wer e entrusted to them. The contribu-
tions· of active members were directly used for payments of pensions to 
retired workers. There was, then, no need for long-term investments. 
Even when private savings were formed, their holders pre-
ferred to invest them in commodities rather than in debt securities with 
their ~ow interest rates and rapid depreciation. The few savings that 
existed were thus economic~ wasted in the bidding up of such things as 
land, jewlry, works of art, gold. 
b. The supp:cy of securitie~. 
1he needs of public and private investors were enormous. 
The tasks of reconstruction, modernization, rebuilding of inventories cal-
led for huge expenditures. Wage and price increases called for increases 
in working capital. The supply of securities would thus have been practi-
cally unlimited, had the market been rea~ to absorb them under reasonable 
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terms; but such was. not the case. Already hurt by inflation, the bond-
market was weakened also by the debt policy of the Governmenta forced 
upon investors through various means of compulsion, govermnent securi-
ties were often sold back in the market soon after they had been issued. 
such sales made the dramatic fall in bond prices inevitable. 
Exhibit VI 
Life Insurance premiums collected in 
France, Algeria and the Overseas Territories (1933=1939) (1945-1951) 
Total insurance Total insurance 
premiums in mil- premiums in mil-
lions current f. lions 1938 f. 
1933 ••••••••• 2,207 3,395 
1934 ••••••••• 2,384 3,784 
1935 ••••••••• 2,441 4, 284 
1936 ••••••••• 2,462 3,788 
1937 ••••••••• 2,426 2,789 
1938 ••••••••• 2,439 2,439 
1939 •••••••• 2,428 2,291 
1945 ••••••••• 7,926 2,o64 
1946 ••••••••• 9,271 1,433 
1947 ••••••••• 11,398 1,129 
1948 ••••••••• 15,246 912 
1949 ••••••••• 20,178 1,081 
1950 ••••••••• 24,641 1,198 
1951 ••••••••• 31,270 1,269 
Source: o. Moreau-Neret "Les Valetn's Francaises de-
puis 194011 p.687-688. Paris, Sirey, 1957. 
The 1948 3% Loan can be used as an example; subscription 
wa.s offered as an alternative to the payment of an excepti onal "anti-in-
flation" tax. The securities were non-marketable, but the law provided 
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that they could be used to subscribe to other pUblic issues. Investors 
who had unwillingly sUbscribed, in order to avoid the tax, took advan-
tage of this provision. They converted their 3% 1948 into marketable 
securities and sold the latter hurriedly, thus accelerating the fall of 
bond prices. Massive sales of "Indemnity Bonds" and "Reconstruction 
Bonds" had a similar effect: 
When several industries and financial institutions were 
nationalized in the years 1944-1945, the expropriated stockholders were 
given "Indemnity Bonds" in exchange for their shares. Many of these bonds 
were immediate~ liquidated by their holders who had no confidence in 
the future of the currency, needed cash or, maybe 1 just did not care for 
debt securities. The "Reconstruction bonds" were issued in payment of 
war-damage claims. Many holders were eager to rebuild their damaged pro-
perty as fast as possible and, in order to get the necessar,y cash, sold 
their bonds to insurance companies and pension funds. The cash thus di-
verted from the market accentuated the imbalance between the demand far 
and the supply of loanable funds. 
In other words, the market suffered from an excessive 
supply of securities at a time when the demand was far below its pre-war 
level. The consequent fall in bond prices can be seen readily in Charti. 
The Goverment made some attempts to support the price of its own issues 
but its efforts were 'UllSUCcessful, as may be seen in the following exam-
ples: after selling above par in 1944-1945, the 3% Rente fell to &J% of 
par in October 1949; it then yielded 5%. The 1945 3% Loan did not fare 
any better; its market price fell to 57% of par-value in October 1949, 
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raising its yield to 5.38%. The 5% Rente was issued at par on April 51 
1949. It fell to 77% of par on June 30 of the same year1 then yiel-
ding almost 6.50%. 
As for industrial bonds1 they suffered the repercussions 
of these developments. The average yield of those listed in the Paris 
Stock Exchange rose from 3.37% in 1945 to 7.50% in 1949. 
Exhibit VII 
Financing through retained earnings 
{1947-1952) 
Retained Earnings 
in billions of f. 
1947 ••••••••• 56 
1948 ••••••••• 230 
1949 ••••••••• 246 
1950 •••••• • •• 335 
1951 ••••••••• 727 
1952 ••••••••• 736 
Source: Rapport de la Commission des In-
vestissements . 
3. Conclusion. 
The evolution of prices and yields in the bond market 
was bound to influence the terms under which new issues were floated. 
interest rates of 6% to ~ became customary for industrial is sues 1 whi-
le the Government offered up to 5%· But1 even under these terms, the 
softness of the bond market did not permit aqy big volume of borrowing 
as appears in Exhibit V. Potential borrowers had to fall back on other 
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means of financing: retained earnings were held at high levels (Exhi-
bit VII); equity financing was., to a large extent, substituted to debt 
financing (Exhibit VIII); the counterpart funds of the Marshall Aid 
were used for loans to State-owned or State-controlled corporations. 
But even this was not enough to satisfy all the needs of the econonu. 
Working at their full lending capacity, commercial banks would have 
been unable to finance the investments and working-capital requirements 
of private firms if the Bank of France had not accepted to rediscount 
their intermediate-term loans. These rediscount operations increased the 
money supply and aggravated inflationar.y pressures. 
Exhibit VIII 
Stock and bond issues 
as a percentage of total securities issued 
( 194&:1952) 
bonds I stocks 
1946 ••••••••• 38 ~ 37% 61. 63% 
1947 ••••••••• 26.06% 73 . 94% 
1948 ••••••••• 1$. 17% 84. 83% 
1949 ~ •••••••• 19 ~ 34% 80. 66% 
19$0 ••••••••• 26 ~04% 73. 96% 
19$1 ••••• •••• 20 . 4.5% 79 ~.5.5% 
19$2 ••••••••• 9. 42% 90. $8% 
Source: o. Moreau-Neret. op . cit. p . 103. 
I 
As for nationalized industries, their investment expenses 
were included in the State Budget and increased its deficit. (see Exhi-
bit II); tax rates were kept high but it was also evident that they had 
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reached a point of diminishing return, since every new: increase resul-
ted in more losses through tax evasion. Increases in corporate taxes 
also contributed to inflation, being immediatel;r passed over to consu-
mers in the form of higher prices. For this reason, increases in the 
expenses ot the Government always resulted in greater budgetary defi-
cits that had to be financed through inflationar,r "advancesn from the 
Bank of France to the Treasury. 
In short, inflation had stopped the formation of priva-
te savings, and the lack of private savings caused more inflation. The 
French financial policy was moving in a vicious circle; something had 
to be done to attract investors to the capital market: they had to be 
given some sort of a guaranty against the depreciation of their funds. 
"Indexed bonds" were devised as a means to achieve this result. 
II. Indexed Bonds 
A. Histo:z 
In times: of inflation, creditors have alwB37s strived to 
protect themselves against possible capital losses by stipulating that, 
in case of monetar,y depreciation, they would receive a greater number 
of monetar,r units than they had actually lent. Similar guaranties were 
sometimes obtained concerning the payment of interests. 
In the Middle- Ages and down to the Seventeenth Century 
such guaranties were of great importance . Economic nationalism, as we 
know it now, had not yet developed and, as a consequence of active co~ 
mercial relations between the various countries or Europe 1 currencies 
of all kinds and origins were often used within the same territory. Sin-
ce the issuers often modified the metal content of their coins, the cur-
rencies in circulation had very fluctuating and unpredictable values. 
As far as loan contracts were concerned, the problem was solved by the 
use of "moneys- of-account" . A money- of- account is a unit, sometimes 
ideal, sometimes corresponding t o an actual curreney, yet of a fixed and 
immutable value; the value of the circulating coins may change in terms 
of the money- of-account, but the latter always remains unchanged. Thus, 
all contracts involving money payments were expressed in terms of some 
money-of- account. Payments of interests and repayments of principal were 
made in actual currencies, but the number of monetary units to be paid 
varied according to the value of each currency in terms of the moneyeof-
account at the time of the payment. 
-37-
Economic nationalism appeared in Europe during the seven-
teenth Century. The various countries on the continent began to esta-
blish protective barriers, all sorts of restrictions were placed on fo-
reign trade . Little by little, the national monetary unit became the 
only accepted means of payment within the national boundaries. Moreover, 
the creation of centralized monetary systems and the desire of the Go-
vernments to force confidence in their fiduciary issues and make them 
legal tender led to the prohibition of guaranty clauses in contracts be-
tween citizens . The persistence of the gold-clause in the United-States 
till it was abolished by the Joint resolution of July 5, 1933 must be 
understood as a heritage of the "free-banking era". 
I£ guaranty clauses became exceptional in contracts in-
volving citizens of the same country - they generally had to be appro-
ved by special legislation -- their use remained quite common in inter-
national transactions. Such guaranties included the use or: 
- "moneys-of-account" alre~ mentioned; one of the most 
famous, the Banco Mark of Hamburg, lasted until 1873 
when it was replaced by the Reichsmark. 
"Gold clauses, " 
- "Exchange guaranties, " 
"Exchange options, 11 
and various clauses involving payments in kind or in-
dexatim on the price of certain commodities. 
These various guaranties Will be described briefly. It 
will e noticed that they all have common ·origin: a lack of confidence 
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in the monetary unit and a desire to protect the creditor by expres-
sing his claims in terms of some commodity deemed more trustworthy, 
be it gold, foreign exchange or a~ other. 
1. 'lhe gold-clause. 
When the gold-clause is used, the loan indenture defi-
nes the gold content of the monetar,y unit in which the claims are ex-
pressed. If the currency happens to depreciate in terms of gold, the 
debtor will have to repq a larger number of monetary units than he 
had actually borrowed. In case the monetar,r unit appreciates in terms 
of gold, the creditor, apparent]J, might suffer. But this is an unlike-
1y eventJ moreover, most gold-clause contracts settle for a minimum 
number of monetary units to be repaid. 
'lhe gold-clause has been used quite .frequently in the 
indentures of international loans. Before 1914, it was used in loans 
floated in France by the Governments of Denmark, Norway, Greece . It was 
also used several times between the two world- wars: 
'!he 7% Rumanian Loan of 1928 (French series) was stipu-
lated in francs of the current type "as defined by the French Law of 
June 25, 1928" . 
The 5!% German Loan of 1930 (Young Loan) was issued in 
several countries. It was stipulated in the monetary unit of each: 
" ••• this monetary unit being defined, for the present purpose and 
in all circumstances, by the gold-content set in the legislation 
now in force . The holder is entitled, in the money of the coun-
try of issue, to the equivalent, at maturity date, of the gold 
value of the sums designated, being it understood that he will 
receive at least the number of units specified on the bonds and 
coupons . " 
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The use of gold-clauses in purely national loans has 
not been so frequent, most countries considering them illegal, as was 
said before. Quite common in the United States up to the 1930's, the 
gold clauses were abolished when it was found that they hampered the 
Govermnent in its efforts to relieve the farmers from the burden of 
their debt. As for the French "Gold Loan" of 1952 - the Pinay Loan --
we shall see later that it was indexed on the value of gold as a com-
modity and not on its monetary value . 
2. The exchange option. 
In the case of an exchange option, the credi toxts claims 
are expressed in several monetary units according to their exchange 
rate at the t:iJne of the loan. At maturity date, or on the dates set 
for interest payments, the creditor will have a choice between the va-
rious currencies mentioned in the contract. He will naturally take the 
most advantageous course and require payment in the strongest currency. 
The value of the guaranty depends on the stability of 
at least one of the currencies between which the creditor is given a 
choice; the greater the number of alternatives~ the better the guaranty. 
Although exchange guaranties were frequently used before 1914, they ha-
ve tended to disappear since. 
3. '!he exchange guaranty. 
In the case of an exchange guaranty, the creditor will 
never receive anything in p~ent except the currency of the countr,y in 
which the loan was floated. However 1 the interests and the principal 
of the' loan will be expressed in the indenture in terms of some foreign 
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currenc,y used as a money~of-account and selected on account of its 
apparent soundness and stability. 
Floated in Switzerland in 1937, the 4% Loan of the French 
* Railways was redeemable in Swiss francs and the interest payable 
in the same currency; but both interest and principal were protec-
ted against a depreciation of the Swiss franc by the granting of an 
exchange guaranty base<i on the U. S, dollar. 
** The French 4% Rente of 1925 was redeemable in francs but 
its capital and interest were indexed on the British Sterling. In 1925 
the pound was worth 95 francs . When the Rente was called in 1942, the 
pound was worth ! . 176. 625. For every bond of f . lOO par-value, the hol-
der received: (10? • 176. 625} -:- 95 : ! . 185. 
4. Guaranties involving pccyment in kind -!HI* 
or indexation on the price of some commodity. 
If indexations on gold and foreign exchange have been 
the most frequent~ used, indexations on the price of a commodity are 
by no means negligible . They may appea:- more clumsy but should not be 
worse guaranties if the commodity has been carefull.y selected. As a 
matter of fact, the best possible hedge against inflation would be a 
guaranty based on the general price index: it will iron out all the 
erratic fluctuations that may appear in the price of any commodity, be 
it gold or foreign exchange . 
Certain rare loans have provided quite simply for redemp-
tion of principal and payment of interest "in kind" . 
* 1, p. 36 
** 1, p. 36 
***57 
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In Russia, for example , the 1922 Loan was indexed on the pri-
ce of rye . Issued at 95% of par, according to the average market price 
of rye, the bonds were redeemable at par and in kind after six months. 
Such clumsy solutions would not be susceptible to a very 
wide applications . 11Real11 payments are too impractical. Yet, in Italy, 
there are some examples of municipal loans (Milan, Genoa) in which the 
bond- holder is given the possibility to cash up to 50% of interest pay-
ments in the form of gaz or electricity charged at the rate that was in 
use when the loan was floated. 
Indexations on the pr ice of one or several commodities 
but with payments in money are more frequent: 
By virtue of an Act of 1777, the soldiers of the Colony of 
Massachusetts wre paid in Treasury bonds. The principal and interest 
of the bonds were to be paid in the lawful currency of the State of Mas-
sachusetts but for a varying amount of monetary units corresponding to 
the price, at the time of the payments, of 5 bushels of wheat, 68 4/7 
pounds of beef, 10 pounds of wool and 60 pounds of leather. The prices 
of these commodities were to be certified by a commission of citizens . 
In Germany and Hungary, the violent inflation that took place 
between 1922 and 1925 made indexations a necessit,y: 
In 1922- 1923, the Staatliche Kreditanstalt Oldenburg issued 
bonds carrying no interest; issued at the price of 125 kilos of rye, 
they were to be redeemed in April 1927 for a sum equal to 150 kilos of 
the same commodity. 
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In 192)1 the State of Hesse (Germany) issued a §% Loan divided 
into 301 000 units ; each "unit11 correspotded to one half the added values 
of one ton of lignite and 50 kilos of rye. 
The 3% Hungarian Loan of December 1923 had both principal and 
interest indexed on the price of wheat . 
More recently, some loans have been guaranteed on 
the basis of general price indices: 
In 1951, the. Swedish 11Kooperativa Forbundet" issued a 3% Loan 
redeemable in 1972 with a possible premium corresponding to the rise of 
the general price itdex, :if any. This premium, however, was limited to 
one half of the par value of the bond. 
One year later, in July 1952, the Christiansen firm announced 
the issue of a series of bonds to be subscribed to by the employees of 
the company. These bonds have exactly the same features as those of the 
SWedish Kooperative Forbundet but the Christiansen plan still deserved 
a special ~ntion1 being, to our lmowledge, the o~ indexed issue out-
* standing in the United States. 
The three loans issued in Finlan:l in 1955 promised a 1% in-
crease in interest and redemption price for ever.y 2% increase in the 
general price index. 
This brief history of indexations had a double purpose: 
first, to show that the problem is not new, that it has always recurred 
in times of monetary instability; second, to describe some of the pre-
cedents among which French financiers could pick a solution to their 
problem. The choice, as we have seen, was fairly wide; not wide enough 
* 13, p . 21 
-43-
however, and the inflexibilit,y of French legislation obliged private 
borrowers to devise indexations of a less obvious anti-inflationar,y 
character . 
B. Legal aspects of indexations . 
It has already been said that, in order to enforce the 
legal-tender character of their fiduciary issues, most Governments ban-
ned the use of anti-inflationary guaranties in contracts between citi-
zens1 such clauses being looked upon as signs of a lack of confidence 
in the stability of the monetary unit . 
l . The Civil Code . 
France is no exception to the rule, and the rigidity of 
the Civil Code on this point is somewhat explained by historic reasons. 
The Goverments of the Eighteen Century had had a very spotty financial 
record; in the first half of the Century, it had been the failure of 
Law•s Bank; during the revolutionary years, the severe inflation touched 
off by excessive issues of "Assignats" -- the French greenbacks -- These 
two unsuccessful attempts at using fiduciary money had made the French 
very suspicious of anything that was not hard cash. If Napoleon's plan 
of financial reorganization - involving creation of the Bank of France --
was to succeed, confidence in monetary stability had to be restored. 
The concept of monetary nominalism, as expressed in Art. l895 of the Civil 
Code was made part of the psychological campaign. It reads: 
n The obligation arising from the lending of money cannot be 
for more than the numerical amount expressed in the con-
tract. If there has been an increase or decrease of specie 
before the time of repayment, the debtor must rep~ the 
numerical amount that was lent, and only this amount, in 
the specie i n use at the time of repayment." 
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This text clearly makes illegal all anti-inflationary 
guaranties, sillce they all involve the repayment of more monetary 
units than were actually lent. 
2. Jurisprudence . 
However, the interpretation of this text by French 
Courts has not been quite so cleat'-cut. If the gold-clause has been 
held illegal at all times, airl especial~ during the periods of incon-
vertibili ty, the validity of other forms of indexation has been upheld 
whenever it was found that the,r were not used solely as a protection 
against monetary fluctuations . In other words, the Tribunals have in-
vestigated the purpose of every indexation in order to appreciate whe-
ther it contradicted or not the true intent of the legislator. It is 
not possible to study here, in all its details , the intricate jurispru-
dence on the subject. It will suffice to summarize the general conclu-
sions reached by the Tribunals. 
Indexations are not valid when their main purpose is to 
avoid the consequences of monetary fluctuations . Indication of such a 
purpose is fourn in the selection of an index having no connection 
with the activities of the borrower' or "most sensitive to monetary 
nuctuations" . consequent~, the Courts nullified indexations based on 
the price of' bicycles -- in the case of a loan contracted by a teacher --
on the price of wheat - although both parties to the contract were far-
mers -- on the wholesale price index, on the retail price index, on the 
* cost-of--living index, etc. 
* 1, ph2 
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On the contrary, illdexations can be valid when they are 
based on possible economic variations in the commercial activities of 
the borrower. The object of the clause is, then, to associate the le~ 
der with the good -- or bad -- fortune of the borrower. In this case , 
however, the Courts usually specify that indexation must work both ways, 
at the advantage, or disadvantage of the lender. 
Some tribunals have been more daring in their interpre-
tation of Art. l895. One of them upheld an apparently illegal indexation 
with the following conclusions: 
" 'lrlhatever the index chosen or commodity chosen - the varia-
tions of which determine the amount to be repaid -- the gua-
ranty clause has always the same character and can have but 
one single aim: t o pr otect the creditor against the conse-
quences of a monetary depreciat ion. • 
There is, however, complete uncertainty as to what atti:-
tude the Cour de cassation ( the Highest Court of Appeal) would take to 
such issues . These legal niceties do not really hamper public borrowers, 
the State in particular, in their use of indexations since the National 
Assembly can always authorize , f or a specific issue, an otherwise illegal 
guaranty. But private borro1-rers must remain within the limits set by the 
Courts. Their choice lies between: 
Indexation of the loan on sone "realn quantity, not expressed in mo-
netar,r terms such as, for example, the volume of output or the producti-
vity per worker of the firm. 
Indexation on the profits of the issuing enterprise or on the divi-
dends it pays to its stockholders . The bonds then become of the partici-
pating type . 
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Indexation on the price of the commodities produced, or services 
sold by the borrowing enterprise provided that the wording of the clau-
se does not reveal obvious anti- inflationary purposes. 
3. Criticism of this jurisprudence. 
These legal limitations to the use of indexations have 
been criticized on many counts: 
First : since French Courts have admitted the validity 
of indexation clauses in many other contr acts such as wage contracts, 
leases, sal.es options, installment sales, life insurance annuities, why 
should the loan contract be treated differently? 
Second: the legislator hilllself has granted the validity 
of such clauses in the field of life insurance annuities, commercial lea-
ses, building contractsJ some laws even went as far as to re-evaluate 
the claims resulting from contracts wher e no indexation clause had been 
included. ·In 1952, a , new min:itn.um-wage law provided for a 5% increase 
in the minimum wage whenever the increase in the monthly consumer price 
' . 
index would reach 5%. Why should creditors be the only ones to suffer 
from inflation when all other categories of citizens are protected? 
Third.zy-: the protection of creditors is a matter of jus .. 
tice . Inflation yields debtors some exorbitant gains . The analysis of a 
4~ loan issued in 1930 by a big French corporation leads to the folio-
* wing conclusions : 
The loan was to be redeemed in fourty years through sinking fund 
p~ents; buying its securities, well under par, on a bond market depres-
sed by inflation, the corporation will be able to retire its debt in 
thirty years only. 
* 1, p. 50 
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Expressed in francs of 1930, the sum of all interest and retire-
ment p~ents will be of o~ 7$ millions, instead of 100 millions that 
were borrowed. It works just as if the corporation, far from paying 
interest, had received 2$ millions from its creditors. 
Fourth: The State itself has issued numerous indexed 
loans or authorized nationalized and State-controlled corporations to 
issue them. Why should the Courts be so inflexible when the Government 
itself takes the lead? 
Fifth: The last and foremost argument in favour of in-
daxations was that they were the o~ means to encourage private savings 
and attract them to the capital market. 
Of coUrse , inflation has the advantage of relieving the 
State of some of its debt burden; yet, how great is the advantage if, on 
the other hand, the State can no longer find on the bond-market the funds 
it needs~-- not to mention the dubious moral value of the .argument - -
In spite of all these arguments in favour of indexations, 
French Courts have generally held firm against the tide) we see several 
justifications to their stand. 
First, it is not for the Courts to. modif'Y the law. They 
went as far as possible in relaxing the rigor of Art. 189$. If more was 
necessar.y, it could not be done without abrogating the Article itself. 
Then it was for the .legislators to take their responsabUities and vote 
a new law. 
Second, the generalization of indexation guaranties may 
unduly limit the freedom of the Government in its economic policy; so 
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it did in the United States in the 19301s as was said before ,. Unable 
to impose their views upon public borrowers, the Courts nonetheless 
indicated, by their attitude towards private issues, their reprobation 
of the course that was being followed. This attitude might have com-
pelled the Government to consider the only real solution to the problem: 
the maintenance of a sound monetar.y policy. 
4. Conclusion. 
The effect of the jurisprudence has been to forbid the 
use of purely "monetaryfl indices such as gold, foreign exchange, price 
indices, etc. , by private borrowers. After re-examination , on. ~ won-
der if such indices are fit for use by private enterprises, anyway • 
. Would it not be too ~rous for them to use indices quite foreign to 
their activity and t~ fluctuations of which need not be accompanied by 
similar variations in the profits of the borrowing enterprise? 
c. A description of some French indexed bonds 
Dldexed bonds have come to represent an :important propor-
tion of French securities outstanding. According to the statistics issued 
by the Ministry of Finances, (Exhibit XI) indexed bonds made up more than 
42% of the total value of all securities (stocks and bonds) issued between 
1951 and 1957. Such a volume, attained in so short a time, shows that in-
dexations reflected a .necessity. The number of issues is equally impres-
sive: 76 iss~s of indexed or participating bonds were floated during the 
same period. All differ in many ways. This great diversity makes it dif-
ficult to consider them all and avoid repetitions at the same time. 
Indexed bonds may differ in several. of their features: 
I . Issues of private firms . 
-Issues indexed on sales 
-Issues indexed on earnings or 
dividends . 
-Issues indexed on other data 
Total private issues: 
II. Issues of nationalized firms. 
-Issues indexed on sales 
-Issues indexed on other data 
Total Natl . firms issues 
III. Government i~sues 
Total indexed issues : 
Exhibit JX 
Issues of indexed bonds 
(1952-1956) 
(Volumes in billions of francs) 
1952 1953 19.54 
number volume number volume number volume 
II 
" " " 
2 8 
" " 
4 6 10 9 
" 
If 2 9 2 19 
n II 6 15 14 36 
" 
It II 
" 
tt It 
2 31 3 48 3 67 
2 31 3 48 > 67 
1 42£ tt II " tl 
3 459 9 63 17 103 
19.55 
number volume 
5 22 
10 10 
2_ 4 
17 16 
1 3 
t1 It 
1 3 
It It 
18 39 
Source: Ministere des Finances. 11Statistiques et Etudes Financieres" no . 105, September 1957, p.l,019. 
1956 
·number volume 
6 27 
7 12 
" 
It 
13 39 
II 
" 1 33 
1 33 
2 403 
16 475 
' 
' 
I 
~ 
'P 
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- They may differ as to the t ype of index ued; 
- As to the elements of the loan actually guaranteed: interest 
alone, principal alone, or both interest and principal; 
- As to the extent of the guarantee, i . e . the relationship that 
exists between the percent variations in the index and those 
in the guaranteed element of the loan. 
Each of these factors will be studied in turn. Authors do 
nr:r'· agr e as to the pl~ce which participating bonds should occupy in a 
stuqy of indexed bonds. M • . Morea~Neret an~es them separatelY; on the 
* contrary, the Ministry of Finances i'ulJ3 assimilates them to ind.exad bonds . 
This. last method w.i.ll be followed here . There are, in fact, few. differen-. 
ces between the two categories since they both have the same purpose and 
since -- different in this from American participating bonds - French 
participating bonds guarantee both the principal and the interest of the 
loan. OnJ.¥ few "WOrds will be said of convertible bonds, to show how 
they differ from American convertibles and how they have been used as an 
inflation hedge . 
J.. The indices . 
The indexation of a loan has but one obje.ctive: to pro-
tect the bond- holder against losses in the purchasing power of his capi-
tal or income. In order to best achieve this aim, the index should be 
selected among those that are likelY to move parallel to the purchasing 
power of the currency. However, the use of these "monetary indices" is 
str ictly regulated by law, as was said before, and practic~ limited 
to public borrowers. 
* 20 
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If the borrower is not willing to give this monetary gua-
ranty, or is not legall1 entitled to do so, several alternatives are open 
to him: He may use an "economic indexation", where the index is a real 
quantity not expressed in monetary terms; or he may use a "composite in-
dexation" 1 were the indexed used is made up of two variables, one real 
and one monetary) or he ma;r index his loan on his profits or on the di-
vidends- he pays to his shareholders: then, his bonds become of the "par-
ticipating" t,ype. 
a. Monetary indices. 
Monetary indices can be general or particular. By "general 
indices" we mean those that will reflect all the variations in the purcha-
sing power of the currency; such -was the price of gold when the interna-
tional, automatic goid-standard was in use; such would now be the exchange 
value of some stable foreign currency or the general price index. 
A particular indexation, on the contrar,y, is based on the 
price of one particular commodity. It is subject, as such, not only to 
broad fluctuations in the value of the monetary unit but also to changes 
in the conditions of demand and supply for this commodity. 
- General indices . 
General monetary indices on:cy- appear in the indentures of 
some Government bond issues . 
The gold clause, in the general acceptation of the term, 
has ceased to exist with the introduction of managed gold-standards . !he 
indexation on the price of gold used in the 3$% Loan of 1952 will be con-
sidered here as an example of indexation on the price of a particular com-
modity. Fluctuations of the price of gold on the free market appear, in 
fact, to be quite independent of the variations in the purchasing power 
of the currency. 
No example could be found, either, of indexations on the 
exchange value of a foreign currency. The situation closest to that 
would be round in the case of the 5i% Loan issued in 1957 by the European 
Steel and Coal Community; distributed in various countries, the securi-
ties have been expressed in terms of the US dollar . Interest and retire-
ment payments are made in dollars, without regard for the nationality or 
residence of the holder. Such a loan thus provides French investors with 
a chance to invest their funds in a currency stronger than . the national 
currency. 
The other general monetary indices used have been: the in-
dex of 295 French stocks and the index of 62 French fixed-income or indexed 
securities, both published by the National Institute of Statistics and Eco-
nomic Studies. 
* In the case of the National Loan of 1956 the capital of the 
bonds bas been indexed on the arithmetic mean of these two indices. Sin-
ce the second of them is made up, f or almost 46%, with indexed securities, 
the mean of the two indices :includes almost 75% of securities the price 
of which may vary with monetar.y depreciation. A substantial rise in the 
securities price indices during the year 1957 brought the redemption price 
to f . 6, 050 in 1958: a 21% increase over the f , 5, 000 par-value of the bonds . 
** The 5%, 1957 Bonds have a par-value of f . lo,ooo. They are to 
be retired over 10 years with a redemption premium of at least f . l , OOO 
* 24 
** 25 
indexed on the French variable securi t i es (stocks) price index. Thus, 
if the index happened to increase by 20% over the base value, the re-
demption premium would increase from f . l ,OOO to f . l , 200. 
- Particular indices . 
A particular indexation is based on the price of some co~ 
modity or service, generally the commodity or service sold by the borro-
wer . The use of these indices is limited to public borrowers for two 
r asons . First, because, t o be meaningful, such an indexation must be 
based on the price of some leading product such as gaz, electricity, tran~ 
portat ion, etc ••• and these industries have been nationalized after the 
second World-\'lar. Second, because such indexations would be dangerous for 
private firms a an increase in the price of a product or ser'Vice does not 
always bring a greater profit t o the producing firm and would not there-
fore enable it to pay a higher interest rate. 
Indexations on the price of a product sometimes involve 
p~ent in kind, but, in the greater number of cases, the servicing of 
the debt will be effected in currency. 
The clauses involving payment in kind are often used in connec-
tion with lottery bonds. 
The 1951 Lottery Bonds of the S. N.C .F.*(French Railways) are 
attributed prizes through periodic drawing of bond numbers . The prizes 
consist in credits for free travels on the French railways. 
** The 1953, 15 years Bonds of the same Company are indexed on the 
price of Railway fares. For interest p~ents as well as for redemption 
* 1, p. 63 
** 36 
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The clauses involving payment in cash are more frequently used. 
They have been used in several bond issues, the most famous of which is 
the 1952 3~ Rente (Pinay nente)* The principal of this loan is indexed 
on the price of the "Napoleon", a 20 francs gold coin, on the free gold-
market. Sinking-fund payments will retire the bonds over a sixty years 
period; the bonds can also be used for the payment of taxes . Twice a year, 
May 31 and November 30, a special decree sets the redemption value of the 
securities to be retired over the next six months . This v:aJ.ue is obtained 
by multiplying the par value of the bond by the average quotation of the 
Napoleon during the 100 days preceding the day of appraisal. 
The Charbonnages de France (nationalized coal mines) have 
issued several series of bonds indexed on a wholesale price-index for 
French coal published by the National Institute of Statistics. 
** . The 5 3/4% 1953 carries some interesting features. The bonds, 
with a f . lo, ooo par value receive a 5 314% interest during the first three 
years, a 6% interest during the following years. Bondholders can ask for 
redemption after three or six years, but the securities are then redeemed 
at par; only those who will wait for the full nine years will enjoy the 
benefit of the indexation. The 6% 1954 carries st;ilar features . 
*** The 5~ 1957 is somewhat different. The interest rates are still 
progressive (5~ during the first 5 years, 6% during the next 10) but they 
also vary with variations in the coal wholesale price-index. Redemption 
after 51 10 or 15 years is no longer left to the option of the holder but 
operated through the drawing of bond numbers. The redemption value is thus 
* 21 
** 27 
*** 29 
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indexed in all cases. But, while in the case of the 1953 and 1954 issues 
the entire capital was indexed, indexation is here limited to a f.4o ~ 
crease for every one percentage point increase in the coal wholesale 
price-index. 
Electricity de France (Electric Utility) has indexed several of 
its issues on the price of the Kilowatt of electricity. The figure taken 
as a base is obtained by dividing the total yearly sales of the company 
* by the total number of Kilowatts sold. The 1952 "Production Shares" recei-
ve yearly interest payments corresponding to the price of 100 Kwh. (with 
a minimum of 720 francs). The redemption price corresponds to the price 
of 2,000 Kwh with a minimum of f .l6,ooo. Sinking fund payments will re-
tire the issue over a period of ten years. Starting in 1958, bondholders 
are entitled to ask for immediate redemption; . in such cases, however, re-
demption is effected at par. Similar issues were floated in 1953, 1954 
and 1958. 
Gaz de France (nationalized gaz utility) issued, in 1953, a 
loan private:cy placed with insurance co.apanies. Interest payments were 
set at the price of 25 cubic meters of gaz, the redemption value at the 
price of 500 cubic meters. 
b. Economic indices. 
In the case of economic indexations, the quantity retained 
as a basis for comparison is a "real" quantity and is not expressed in 
monetary terms; production and productivity figures are the indices c~ 
monly used. As in the case of monetary indices, economic indices can be 
either general or particular. 
* 37 
- general indices . 
The most convenient of these indices is the general index 
of industrial production published by the National Institute of Statistics. 
This index is a weighted average of the production figures of the various 
branches of the French industry. 
* The 5% Bons d'Equipemetlt Industrial et A&ricole (Government bonds) 
issued in 1956 had their interest indexed on this figure . The prospectus 
declares: "over and above the 5% fixed interest, the holder will receive 
a variable allowance . This allowance will be computed according to the 
level reached during the preceding year by the index of industrial produc-
tion. The allowance will be of 0. 05% of the face value of the bond for 
every percentage point of the index above the 1955 level. " The interest 
paid in 1957 ~s of 5.55%, reflecting a rise of the index by 11 percentage 
points between 1955 and 1956. 
- Particular indices. 
These indices, based on the production or productivity of 
a particular firm or industry have been more widely used than the general 
indices. Even a private firm can make its interest and capital payments 
vary ld. th its own production or productivity without too much danger; a 
rise in pr oductivity is most ~ikely to bring increased profits; ·a rise in 
production should have the same result, fixed costs being distributed over 
a bigger vo~ume of sales. 
The 6% J.957 of ctricite de France~~ be redeemed over fif-
teen years through sinking func1 9 nts. 'l'he redemption va.Lue is equal 
* 23 
** .34 
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to the par vaiue of the bonds (f. 21 000) plus a redemption premium of 
f . l , OOO indexed on the total production of electricity. If, fore~ 
pie, this producyion increases by 9% -- as it did from l9SJ to 1954 --
the redemption premium will increase from f . l , OOO to £. 11090. The bond-
hoider is given an extra advantage in the fact that the minimum redemp-
tion premium increases automatical~ as time passes whether production 
increases or not. 
* The 5% i95' of. the Char bonnages de France m~ ~e selected as 
an example of indexation of a ioan on the productivity of an enterprise . 
Both intex·est and principal of the loan are indexed on the 11 rendement 
fond" , i . e . the volume of coal produced per miner, per day. The index is 
published by the Nationai Inst itute of Statistics. The figure taken as a 
base was that of i95l : i 1 307 kiios . The indenture provides for a 0. 2$% 
incr ease in the interest rate for every 100 kilos of increase in the in-
d~. As for the redemption premium, payabie when the ioan is redeemed, in 
1960, its value wili be of f . lO per percentage point increase in the pro-
ductivity. The ~ premium is of £. 11 900. 
A private firm, Somua, indexed its 19$3, 5 3/4% bonds on a pro-
ductivity figure obtained by dividing the total yearly sa.J.es of the firm 
by the total ~umber of iabor hours . 
c. Composite indices. 
A composite index combines the advantages of a monetar,y in-
dex with those of an economic index. The one most frequent~ used is the 
sales figure of the borrowing firm. It is clear that in this case the prin-
cipal and interest of the bond will vary both with the increase in the out-
* 26 
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put of the firm and with increases in the price of this output. If they 
move in the same direction, these two figures multiply by each other: if 
both volume of output and se~ling price double, for examp~e, the sales 
figure increases four times . But, on the other hand, vol~ and prices 
may also offset the effect of each other when moving in opposite direc-
tions . The indexation of a bond on the sa~es f igure of a firm was ini-
tiated by the legislator in the case of the indemnity bonds already men-
tioned, and given to the former stockholde~s of nationalized industries. 
The bonds of the caisse Nationale de l •Energie * were given to 
the former stockholders of the gaz and electric utilities . These bonds 
receive a fixed interest of 3% plus a v~iable allowance . The redemption 
value is of £. 11000 plus a variable redemption premium. Every year, 1% 
of the proceeds fro.m sales of gaz and electricit.r is used for the payment 
of these interests and redemption premiums on the bonds not yet retired. 
In the case of the bonds of the Charbonnages de ·France, given 
as an indemnity to the former sha~eholders of nationalized coal-mines, 
the payment or interest bonuses and redemption premiums is financed through 
ear-marking of 0. 25% of the total sales of coal. 
The Regie Nationale des Usines Renault (cars) issued two series 
of bonds with indexation on sales : 
the 5~ 1955 ** provides for interest and redemption premimns 
varying with the sales of the company. The base figure is that of sales 
for the year 1953. The figure used to calculate interest and redemption 
* 1, P• 72 
** 40 
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value is that of sa~es, two years before the year of the p~ent. For 
ever,y 1% increase in the sales figure, interests increase by f . l . l O, 
redemption value by f . 2o. 
Indexations on sales are quite frequent in loans issued by pri-
vate firms . The Groupement de ~ • Industrie Siderurgique off ers examples 
of such indexations with its 1957 and l958 iss'IJils.* This 11 Groupement11 
is inter esting on other counts: it iLlustrates the tendency of some firms 
working in the same fie~d of endeavour, to unite into grcmps for purposes 
of financing. Thus, instead of coming on the capital market with their 
own ~imited credit and sm~l scattered issues, they float one big issue 
whose proceeds are .Later apportioned among the participants according to 
a predetermined schedule . 
The 6% issue of October ~957 was made with the participation of 
24 different firms, ~1 working in the field of metaJ..1urgy: foundries, 
steel miLLs, or e mines, etc . The responsabi~ity of each participant is 
.Limited to its own share in the proceeds of the ~oan. Both interest and 
redemption value are indexed on the sales of the French iron industry,; 
this figure is arbitrar~ determined as the product of two elements: the 
number of tons of steel produced in France during the year .considered and 
the average price of a ton of steel -- determined by applying a coeffi-
cient of ~.jO to the monthly average for ~aminated products -- For ever,y 
1% increase of sales in the year preceding payment over the sales figure 
taken as a base, interest payments are increased by f . l . 50 and redemption 
price by f . 25. To pr ovide for the case where the index would not budge, 
* 42 
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and give bondholders a greater advantage, a mninmum redemption value is 
promised which increases automatically as time passes . 
The 1958 issue of the same Groupement carries similar features . 
However, in this case, not only the redemption premium but also the inte-
rest rate increases automatically as time goes by. Starting at 6% for the 
first five years, it rises gradually to reach 7% between 1978 and 1983. 
Many similar indexations on sales have been used: 
The Groupement des Industries de la Construction Electrique (a 
group of electric and electronics industries) indexed its 1953 and 1957 
issues on the industry's "Total Sales" figure , as pUblished in the Bulle-
tin of the National Institute of Statistics. 
* The 1956 5% of Saviem L.R.S. (trucks and machinery) provided 
for increases of f . l in interest and f . 20 in redemption value for every 
one percentage point of increase ·in the sales figure of the corporation. 
d. Dividends and earnings as indices . 
If they have but little connection with the general level 
of prices, dividends and earnings are , by far, the safest indices far use 
by private borrowers; they relate the debt of the firm to its paying abi-
lities and give the bondholder a participation in the profits of the entar-
prise . These advantages explain wcy more issues were made with this type 
of indexation than with any other. 
The indexation of bonds on the dividends paid to the common 
stockholders of the borrowing enterprise has been used in several issues : 
The 5~ 19$3 of Pechiney (chemicals) provides for indexation of 
interest and principal on the dividends declared on the common stock out-
standing at the time of the issue . 
* 55 
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In 1953, Organico (plastics) used dividends as an index for 
the principal and interest of a f . l , $00 millions . Yet, since the firm, 
one of Pechineyt s subsidiaries, was still quite new and not yet known as 
to its profitability, the indexation was made on the dividends of the 
. 
holding company. This example seems to throw a light on the real mea-
ning of "participating bonds": their real purpose is not to give the 
bondholders a participation in the profits of the company, but to pro-
vide them with a guaranty that their claims will increase in absolute va-
lue as time passes . They are a compensation for losses incurred because 
of inflation. This is our justification for assimilating them with "in-
dexed bonds11 • 
The indexation on dividends declared has a certain disad-
vantage for the bondholders: a board of directors may very well suspend 
for some time, or reduce, the declaration of dividends, thus making the 
indexation worthless . This is the reason why, in recent years, most com-
panies have indexed their bonds on both dividends and retained earnings • 
.Among others are: 
Andre Citroen S. A. (cars) in its 6% issue of 1954* and its 51?% 
issues of 1955 and 1956 
** de Wendell & Cie (metallurgy) in its 6% issue of 1954. 
*** In its 5t% issue of 1956, Simca (cars) excluded the legal reser-
ve from the index. Since the amount of this reserve is determined by the 
legislator, the board of directors cannot be suspected of witholding it 
on purpose . 
* 46 
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~. The variable element. 
We have seen that indexed bonds vary as to the type o.f 
index used; we shall see that they also vary as to the element o.f the 
loan that is actual~ guaranteed. To be .fully protected against the evils 
o.f inflation, the boridholder would like to see both principal and inte-
r st payments vary in accordance. with the purchasing power o.f the curren-
cy. The preservation o.f the capital he has saved and invested is certain-
ly his main concem, but the stability o.f his income receipts in terms· o.f 
purchasing power is by no means a matter o.f indi.f.ference a sons investors 
still rely on interest payments as a means o.f living. 
Although many issues have guaranteed both the principal 
and the interest o.f the bonds, this is not always the case . Some issues 
have indexed the principal alone, others the only interest. 
a . indexation o.f the capital. 
This is, really, the main concern o.f the investor, and most 
issues have provided .for it; however, the guaranty is sometimes limited 
to indexation o.f the redemption premium alone and the investor ought to be 
very careful since the difference is not always evident .from the wording 
o.f the prospectuses . · 
In the case o.f a 100% indexation o.f the principal, there 
can be no equivocation. In the case o.f the 3i% Rente 1952, .for example, 
where only the· capital was guaranteed, there could be no doUbt as to the 
type of the guaranty: issued at a price corresponding to the value of 
25 gold coins, the bonds would be redeemed at a price corresponding to the 
value of the same 25 coins . The capital was .fully guaranteed. 
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In other cases 1 the ind~ation is devised in such a way 
that the value of the principal does not move exactly parallel to the 
variations of the index, percentage-Wise . In the case of the 1952 bonds 
of the Charbonnages de France, for example, the appreciation of the capi-
tal :is set arbitrarily : f . lO per kilo increase in the productivity of 
the French miners. Can we speak, in thiscase, of an indexation of the 
capital? certainly. If we convert the figures into percentage inc~eases, 
we even find that the indexation coefficient is greater than 1. The bonds 
had a par-v~ue of f . lo, ooo. The productivity per miner taken as a base 
was of 1, 307 kilos; thus, for every 0. 075% increase of the index, the 
principal of the bonds increases by 0.1%. Yet, the prospectus of the is-
sue chooses to present the indexation in the form of a "redemption premium 
increasing with the productivity. " 
The 6% 1957 of Electricite de France *, speaks of an"indexed 
redemption premium" . The careless reader may see no difference between 
this clause and that of the above mentioned issue. The guaranty is ~uite 
different, however . In this case, it is not the principal of the bond -
t . 2o1 0001-- which is indexed on the French production of electricity but 
the redemption premium of f . l , OOO . Thus, if the production of electricit,y 
happened to double1 the bonds would be redeemed at f . 22, ooo, a 10% increase 
over the par- value for a 100% increase in the index. The indexation of the 
redemption premium is, in fact, a very slight guaranty for the bondholder. 
b. Indexation of the interest aione. 
Such indexations are very se.Ldom used. The guaranty to the 
bondholder is not great enough to serve as an attraction. An example would 
* .34 
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be the 5% Bons d•Equipement * issued in 1956 by the Treasury. The in-
crease in interest rate is of 0. 05% for every percentage point increase 
in the index of industrial production taken as a base. 
c. Indexation of both capitaL and interest. 
This is the type used most frequently, at Least in recent 
years . NationaL .Loans issued by the Treasury usual.!.y Limit the guaranty 
to the principal, but both nationaLized industries and private firms use 
the double indexat ion of pr incipal and interest in their indentures . For 
example, the Charbonnages de France**( ~% ~952, 5i% L957, 6% L958), Elec-
tricite de France ***(Parts de production ~9521 Parts de production L95;, 
Parts de production ~954, Parts de production 1958) S. N. C. F. (Bons L9531 
0% ~9541 5!% ~956) Hegie -ationale des Usines RenaULt (;i% L9;; et ~ L957) 
Groupement de .L •Industrie Siderurgique (6% L957 1 6% L95tl) S.A. A.ndre <::itroen 
(6% ~954, 5~ ~955, 5~ L956) . 
Both principal and interest usually vary with the same index 
uthough the "coefficient of indexation" is not always the same. 
j . The coefficient of indexation. 
we have seen, in the case of the ~952 issue of the Charbon-
nages de France that the variabLe elements of the Loan do not always move 
exact:cy paraLlel to the index, percentage-wise . The variations in princi-
pal and interest are sometimes greater, sometimes smaller than those in 
the index. The relationship can be expressed in a "coefficient of indexa-
tion11 1 i . e . the ratio: 
-:f 2j 
** 26, 29 , :so 
*** .:Sl, j2 , JJ, J5 
variation in the bondhoLder's claims 
varJ.atJ.on J.n the J.n ex. 
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If the coefficient is lower than l , the bondholder does 
not receive the fuLl advantage of the indexation. If it is above 1, he 
receives more . The most frequent case is that Of coeff~cients inferior 
to ~. This is the reason wny the coeffic~ent of indexat~on is of ten 
caJ..Led • coefficient of mitigation11 : mitigation of the burden p.iaced on 
the borrower. Coefficients higher than .L do exist, however : such was the 
case with the .i952 bonds of the Charbonnages de France referred to above . 
The coefficient of indexation is easy to determine when 
the variations in both the index and the variab.Le e.lement are expressed 
in percentage points . 
The prospectus of the 5% .L956 NationaL Loan * (indexed on the 
arithmetic mean Of the fixed-income and variable income securities price-
indices) reads : 11 The x·edemption va.iue of the securities is determined by 
raislng their face va.Lue by a percentage equal to the percentage increase 
in the ind.er• . 11For examp.ie,il the average index of securities prices in-
creases by ~0% over that of .L955, the capita.L redeemed wi.L.L be equaJ. to 
f. l~O ,OOO for a f • .iOO, OOO par-va.iue 11 • The coeff~c~ent of indexation clear-
.1:y equaLs .l. 
'I'he 5~ .L95J of Pechiney was indexed for principal and interest, 
on the dividends dec.lared by the company. 'l'he prospectus states : n the in-
terest paid on the bonds every year wi.il be equal to the fixed interest of 
5!% raised in a proportion equal to .L/J of the percentage increase in the 
** dividends of the year over those taken as a base . 11 The coefficient of 
indexation is thus of .l/J • 
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Whenever the interest and redemption payments are expres-
sed in terms of a certain commod~ty, the coefficient of indexation is 
equally easy to determine and almost alw~s equal to .L. 
The 3!% Rente of 1952 was issued at a price corresponding to 
the average va.Lue ot: twenty "Napo.Leons" in the year preceding the issue . 
It is redeemed at a price corresponding to the value of the same twenty 
gold coins during the year preceding redempt~on. 
The 5~ .L956 of the s . N. C.F. have a par-value of f . lo, ooo a .L,60o 
times the f. 6 . ~5 rate ot: the passenger/kilometre at the time of the issue. 
They are redeemed at a price corresponding to 1, 600 times the passenger/Kill 
rate at the time of redemption. 
It is eas.y to see that, in both cases, bondho.Lders• claims 
vary in direct re~ation with the collllllodity prices taken as indices . The 
coefficient of indexation is equal to 1. The coefficient of indexation 
is not quite so apparent when the clause merely indicates that a princi-
pal or interest bonus of so many francs will be paid for every percentage 
point increase in the index. To get an exact idea of the value of the gua-
rant.y, the potential investor must f irst convert these figures into percen-
tage variations. 
The 6% 1957 of the Regie Nationale des Usines Renault * is ~ 
dexed on the sales of the company. The bonds were issued at their par- va-
lue of f . 10, 000, yielding a minimum yearly interest of 6%. For every 1% 
increase in the sales of the company, yearly interest payments are increa-
sed by f . l . 20 . This is a 0. 2% increase over the f . 60o fixed interest. The 
coefficient of indexation is of 0. 2% 
1% 
*41 
or 1 ; the borrowing firm was 
T 
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not willing to grant full indexation, and limited the v.ariations of the 
bondholders ' claims to 20% of the variations of the index. 
D. Conclusion 
After a long period of almost constant inflation, "indexa-
tiozi' has become a magic word in the French bond-market . It has appeared 
in an increasing number of issues1 always extensivelY advertised, prin-
ted in double- size letters in prospectuses, accompanied by alluring mot-
tos, promising charts . What has been said before of ind.exations should 
be sufficient to indicate that investors and analysts must take nothing 
for granted in this domain; there are indexations of all kinds1 some ac-
companied by so many limiting clauses that they guarantee nothing except 
the right for the borrower to call his loan an "indexed bond11 issue. 
Bondholders are generally satisfied with the assurance that 
the creditor is solvent (and liquid) and that future operation will gene-
rate enough cash for him to make·· interest and redemption payments . The 
investor in indexed bonds wants to know much more: he wants to make sure 
that his revenue will not suffer through depreciation of the currency. 
He often pays for that guaranty by accepting lower interest rates 1 smal-
ler redemption premiums; he should not p~ that price for a mere illu-
sion. He must evaluate the future evolution of the index and to what ex-
tent this evolution will be reflected in both the price and yield of his 
security. Such an evaluation supposes an extensiv~ analysis of all the 
factors involved. When the indexation is made on the sales and profits 
of the borrowing enterprise, the bondholder's stake in the progress of 
the company becomes almost that of a stockholder . 
Th~ borrower's point of view should not be overlooked ei-
ther in this matter of indexations. To a certain extent1 indexation has 
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become a necessity for him, as a means of attracting loanable funds . But 
he must make sure that the burd~n he asswnes will no:t: prove out of pro-
portion with the advantages secured. The guaranty he gives, if it ia 
of some value and not a mere label on the security, should be reflected 
in better terms of issue. Indexation should not lead the borrower to pay 
more than what he actually receives through inflation. 
Also at stake, in this issue, is the general economic wel-
fare of the Nation. Are indexations a proper answer to the problems of 
inflation? Will they tend to hold inflation in check or will they, on 
the contrary, aggrava~ inflationary pressures? 
These are some of the problems that will be raised in the 
second part of this study. There may not be any clear-cut solution to 
them, as_ many unknown elements come into play but the search may, in it-
self, lead tobetter penetrate some of the problems of inflation. 
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III. Indexed bonds and the investor 
A. Introduction 
Indexations should not be judged from an overly dogmatic 
point of view.; one must remember that they did not pretend to be ratio-
nal so.Lutions to the problems of inf'.iation but emergency measures devised 
to enable the .French economy to cope with acset of particular circumstan-
ces; these circumstances have been described at some length in the first 
part of this study; it will suffice to summarize them here in a few words. 
In 1952, seven years after the end of the second World-War., 
the French economy ~as still struggling in the midst of financial diffi-
culties. Inf.iationary pressures were as strong as ever and threatened the 
country with financial bankruptcy unJ.ess something was done to curb them. 
It seemed that the main cause for the current inf'.Lation lay in the imba-
lance between savings and investments, in the fai.iure of the capital mar-
ket to attract private funds towards the tasks of reconstruction. 
The contribution of the capita.L market to the investment 
effort of the postwar years has been very sma.J.l, both in absolute terms 
and in relation to national income. hile economic p.ianners had found it 
desirable that 8 to 9% of the nationaJ. income be save~ and used for their 
stated purposes, the securities market remained well below these require-
ments as may be seen in Exhibit x. 
Yet, the objectives of the P.ian of Reconstruction and Moder-
nization were generally met within *ix years. This means that a great pro-
portion of investment outlays had to be financed through retained ear-
nings, foreign loans and gifts, and inflationary methods like direct ad-
vances from the Bank of France to the Treasury or rediscounting of com-
mercial paper by the central bank. Financial leaders were failing to 
what is, according to Mr . W. Mc . Chesney, their primary duty: tt see to it 
that created money does not substitute for savings in such a w~ as to 
* contribute to an erosion of the purchasing power of the people. n 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
Exhibit X 
Investments in the capital market in 
proportion to the national income 
( 1947- 1952) 
National income Bonds and stocks % of Nat. Ino . 
(billion francs) subscr . in cash invested in 
(billion francs) securities 
3, 400 64 1.9 
5, 440 197 .; .6 
6, 500 . 178 .2. 7 
7, J50 124 J. ~ 7 
8, 960 95 1.1 
10,540 :;:;5 3.2 
Source : Moreau-Neret: 11Les Valeurs Francaises depuis 1940" - P• 700 
Besides hurting very seriously the recipients of fixed in-
come - Keynes • euphemism about the euthanasia of the rentier was amply 
di~roved in this occasion - it was evident that inflation had become 
self- generating as every new spurt increased the gap by encouraging in-
vestments and discouraging savings . Industrial firms had constant need 
for more working capital to pay increased wages and inventory. They al-
so tended to invest more, and the high profitability of the consumers 
* 75 
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goods industr,y diverted towards it funds that would have been more . useful-
ly employed elsewhere. 
There was some indication that the problem woUld not vanish 
but grow even more acute as years passed by. Several international agree-
ments had already set the principle of a gradual .liberalization of trade. 
France was about to join the European Steel and Coal Community as a first 
step towards a wider European market; it was fe.lt that, when the national 
market opened to competition, industrial and commercial firms would have 
to reduce their profit margins and wou.ld not be able to p~nugh back as 
much capital as they had been doing in recent years . The high interest-
rates prevailing in the French capital market woUld a.lso put them at a 
* disadvantage in internation~ competition. 
For these reasons the capi~l - market had to be reorgani-
, 
zed and its contribution to investment out.lays increased. There were idle 
riches in the hands of the French people; the problem was to attract them 
towards productive uses . 
It had to be admitted that the attempts made at using force 
had failed to attain:·_this result . Offered as an alternative to the pay-
ment of a special "Tax to combat inflation" 1 the National Loan of l9481 
by the massive sales of bonds it produced, had had the ultimate effect of 
. . 
further depressing the market . (see part I) What had been gained through 
this issue had been lost on others. Moreover, compulsion was without ef-
feet on hidden hoards and on the flight capita! invested abroad; it could 
not attract foreign capital to France either • As for taxes, their rates 
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had already reached such levels that every new increase was immediate~ 
reflected in the prices of commodities . Besides, tax evasion often off-
set the effect of a rate imrease . So many Cabinets had already made 
promises and appealed for confidence and spirit of sacrifice - without 
much result - that the public would not be satisfied with words . This 
was the time for realism, even if some of the old estab!ished princip!es 
had to be disregarded. With its indexation on the price of gold, the 
npinay Rente" was the first important attempt at this type of a matter-
of- fact approach. As an editoria!ist correctly remarked: 
n The fact that a loan of this type should have to be offered 
is not ca!cUiated to inspire confidence in the franc , but 
it reflects the touch of realism that is the hall- mark of 
the Pinay 1s Government. " * 
whether justified or not , this new kind of an approach 
was going '00 become increasing!y popular in the years to fo.Llow. The 
reasoning behind indexations was this : Even a 7% yield could not make 
the expected return from invested funds positive in the face of an ave-
rage depreciation of the currency by !2% a year . Besides, no interest 
rate could be paid that would be high enough to induce investors to paJtli 
with their gold and foreign exchange for the sake of buying securities. 
If, on the contrary, they were given a guaranty as to the stabi.Lity of 
their capital in terms of purchasing power, the prospect of interest pay-
ments would make securities more attractive than unproductive hoards . 
The motto for the Pinay Loan was 11 de .L 1or qui rapporte" (gold that yields 
~ revenue) . The increased demand for bonds wou!d have secondar.y effects. 
It wou!d induce bond prices to rise, thereby reduce yie.Lds and enable 
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borrowers to obtain funds on cheaper terms, inasmuch as market yields 
and terms of issue are c~ose!y corre~ated. Thus, the first important 
thing was to know whether the indexations granted would be efficient 
enough, as an inflation hedge, to make investments attractive . 
B. Indexation as an inf~ation hedge 
The relative stabUity of the franc in the years follo-
wing 1952 gave indexed bonds ~ittle opportunity to prove their effi-
cienc.y as anti-inf~ation guaranties. 
Exhibit XI 
Cost-of-living index. All items 
(~952-1958) 
Years Index c~oo : 1938) 
1952 lOl 
1953 100 
.L954 .LOO 
1955 101 
.L95b 103 
1957 106 
1958 122 
Source: . U. N. Bulletin of monthly statis-
tJ.cs . March 1959. (p.l52) · 
The cost-of-living index reproduced in Exhibit XI shows 
that, from 1952 to 1955, the purchasing power of the franc remained un-
changed. In 1957 it had dropped by 4. 8% but it was only in .L958 that 
it fe.Ll by a percentage big enough (.1.4%) to rea.L.Ly test the value of in-
dexed bonds ·as an inf~ation hedge. The facts are st~ so recent that 
it is difi'icul t to :v from them any clear-cut conclusion. It takes 
some time before statistics can be sorted, tabulated and published. As 
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we shall see later, there is also.a lag, very often, between the depre-
ciation of the monetary unit and the response of the indices. It might 
still take some time for the 1958 inflation to be fully reflected in the 
interest payments and redemption values of the various bonds outstanding. 
This means that this discussion will have to remain somewhat theoretical, 
and should be considered as a tentative approach to the problem, although 
no opportunity will be missed of making use of the available data. 
The value of indexations as an inflation hedge can be found 
in the degree of correlation between variations in the cost- of-living in-
dex and variations in the principal and interest of the loan. If the ra-
tio is one , i . e . if variations in the cos- of- living index are followed 
by variations in principal and interest of similar amplitude, the bond 
is a good inflation hedge . · The correlation depends on two factors: 
- The "coefficient of indexation" , already mentioned, which is an ele-
ment of the indenture: the borrower sets a limit to the guaranty by deci-
ding, for example, that variations in the index will be reflected for on~ 
~ 50% in the variations of the indexed elements of the loan. 
:.. The index itself, and its capability to reflect variations in the 
purchasing power of the currency fully and immediate~. 
The purpose of the following pages will be to stuqy the 
various indices and see how well ~hey reacted to the depreciation of the 
franc . 
1 . Indexation on foreign exchange . 
Indexation on foreign currencies has not been used in re-
cent years for loans issued on the national market . Yet , some foreign 
bonds expressed in foreign currencies and traded in the Paris Stock Ex-
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change give French investors a. somewhat similar guaranty. Typical of 
these bonds is the $i% 19571 Communaute Europeenne du Charbon et de 1 1~­
cier in which both principal and interest are expressed and paid in U.S. 
dollars. These bonds have been very successful in the French market 
where the fluctuations of their price closely follow. those of the "free" 
dollar. They are very sensitive to the speculative moods of the inves-
tors and a run on the franc like the one which took place at the begin-
ning of 1958 maw carry their prices far above the official eXChange rate . 
If foreign bonds, especially those expressed in dollars, 
have efficientlY protected French investors against the depreciation of 
their capital, it should not be concluded that their value as an infla-
tion hedge is absolute a 
First because, in the present days, the purchasing power 
of few currencies is stable . Dollar investments protect French bondhol-
ders against the depreciation of the franc in terms of dollars; it could 
not protect th~m against the absolute depreciation of the dollar. 
Another danger for investors, not very great some years 
ago but which could materialize if the French Govermnent stood firm in 
its policy of austerity and monetary stability, would be an appreciation 
of the franc in terms of dollars. After selling for f . 581 200 at the be-
* ginning of 1958, the 5~ 1957 of the cornmunit,y sold for f . 501 900 on 
March 311 1959. ($100 par value) . Contrary to l'lhat happens in the case 
of indexations, price variations on foreign bonds work for the disadvan-
tage as well as for the advantage of the bondholder. 
* 5 
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2.. Indexation on gold. 
Both the 11Pinay Rente" of 1952 and the Ji% Rente of 1958 
were indexed on the price of the 20 francs gold coin on tha Paris "free" 
market. The choice of gold as an index was justified by the psychologi-
cal appeal this commodity seems to have for French investors; it is the 
last refuge in times of inflation and crisis (Chart III) . 
As in the United States, the trading of gold had been il-
legal in France for many years , except for authorized purposes, and pri-
ces for 1947 and 1948 are unofficial quotations of the black market . The 
decision to allow a free market was taken in 1948 as part of a policy of 
financial restoration. By allowing transactions in gold, the Govermnent 
seemed to imply that the franc would be kept strong enough to stand the 
pressure . There was~ at the same time, the idea that transactions in the 
open could be more eas~ controlled and managed by financial authorities . 
In 1952, the decision of Antoine Pinay, Prime Minister and Minister of 
Finance, to index his loan on gold was also part of a wide financial pro-
gram. Investors were asked to bring their hoards of gold and foreign ex-
change as subscription to securities which were "safer than gold" since 
they offered a double guaranty both against devaluation of the franc and 
a fall in the price of gold; launched to the accompaniment of all th~ 
resources of propaganda, granting important tax exemptions, the Loan was 
not quite a success yet . It did result in some subscriptions in cash but 
a greater share was subscribed to with securities of previous Government 
issues not favored with similar advantages. As for subscriptions in gold 
and foreign exchange, they were quite limited in amount; this is not too 
surprising, considering the guaranty given and its real value: the price 
77~ 
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of f . 4, 000 'for the "Napoleon" taken as a base was so much above the value 
of the gold content of the coin on the international market that further 
rises seemed improbable . A British commentator wrote at the time: 
" The present value of the gold coin on the Paris market stands 
at a premium of near~ 40% over the free-market price of gold 
bars which itself is at more than 6% premium over the official 
price of gold. The French authorities are, therefore, giving 
themselves a fairly generous margin. Even assuming a further 
depreciation of the franc , it should be possible, by minting 
new coins, to keep down the price of the Louis and thus prevent 
the depreciation of the currency from translating itself into 
a corresponding increase in the price at which the French autho-
rities would have to accept the bonds for tax purposes . " * 
There is no indication that the minting of ne~ coins had to be used 
to keep the indexation from operating. The 'fall of the price of gold an 
the international market from $39 an ounce in January of 1952 to $35 
(United States Treasury purchase price) in '1953, the Pinay Loan itself 
which brought some sales and also the influence of several years of appa-
rent monetary stability were enough to bring the price of the Napoleon 
down to f . 2, 500 in June of 1955. As inflation loomed again by the end of 
that year, the price of the Napoleon rose once more and axceeded f . 4, 000 
several times between August 1957 and August 1958; yet, it did not go 
high enough nor did it stay above the f . 4, 000 line long enough to raise 
the average figure on which the indexation is based over the critical 
. . 
point. Thus, in spite of a 22% increase of the cost- of-living index, the 
value of the 3i% Rente for tax payment purposes has never been above the 
face value o.f the bonds . The "good as gold" securities have proved ave-
ry poor inflation hedge . 
* 82, p. 469 
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Does this mean that the indexation of this loan will ne-
ver operateZ Maybe not . Since 1952, two devaluations of the franc have 
brought the price of the Napoleon closer to the value of its gold con-
tent in the international market. At $3), an ounce of gold (31.1035 gr. ) 
is now worth abo~t f . l71 255, and the Napoleon (5 . 8 gr. ) is worth f . 3, 220. 
Taking into account the fact that coins have a more active market, cone 
sequently sell at a higher price per ounce than bars, the Napoleon is now 
likely to fluctuate closer to the f . 4, 000 line. If another spurt of ~ 
£lation should now take place, the indexation would probably operate . In-
dexed on the basis of a price of f .3, 60o for the Napoleon, the 3!% 1958 
gives the bondholder a still better guaranty. 
It would be unjust not to mention here the very great ad-
vantages the Pinay Rente have had for their holders . Its tax advantages, 
the fact that it could be used at par value for the payment of taxes and 
also the fact that, if it did not operate, the indexation was sometimes 
very close of doing so, all these factors gave to the market price of the 
Rente a stability enjoyed by few other fixed- income securities . 
3. Indexation on the price of securities. 
The National Loan of 1956 had its capital fully indexed on 
the two indices of stock and bond prices published by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics and economic studies. The· figure of 214, taken as · a 
base was the mean of 302 (stocks) and l27(bonds)for the year 1955. In 1958 
the index had reached 239, arithmetic mean of 350 (stocks) and 128. 3 (bonds) . 
In 1959, sinking fund p~ents will be of f . lll,700 for bonds of f . loo,ooo 
par-value: a 11. 7% increase for a 18% increase in the cost-of-living index. 
However, it should not be concluded on the basis of this 
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experience that the securities price index is an absolute gu arantee 
against inflation. The prices of bonds and stocks are primarily 
determined by the conditions of supply and demand on the securities 
market and they may for this reason move quite differently f rom the 
prices of other commodities . 
a. Index of stock prices 
Stock prices have a general tendency to move upwards in 
times of inflation; ye t , under certain conditions, this upward move-
ment may very well lag behind the rise in commodity prices as may be 
seen in chart IV.Until 1945, an exceptional volume of loanable funds 
~aised the average price of stocks above the ' cost-of-living i ndex 
but the movement levelled off . After 1947, stock p~ices lagged behind 
and it was not until 1954 that their index caught up with and passed 
the cost-of-living. 
Several explanations may be given for this lag: 
First, the bullish effect of increased demand for equity secur-
ities as opposed to debt securities was to some extent offset by the 
increase in the supply of such securities; urgent needs for funds and 
the bearish bond market with its high yields compelled borrowers to 
tap the equity market more frequently. 
Second, the liquidity problems created by inflation and the need 
for more retained earnings caused firms to reduce dividend p~ents 
which had an adverse effect on stock prices . 
In inflation attributable to economic growth alone, these 
adverse factor s are generally more t han offset by the optimism of 
investors as to the future of the economy and the stock prices often 
rise higher than commodity prices . The inflation that took place in 
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Chart IV 
Compared variations of the General Price Index 
and of the index of stock prices. (193S:1945) 
Average of wholesale and retail price indices. 
Index of stock prices. 
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France between 1945 and 1952 gave little cause for optimism. A sue-
cession of political crises and the fear of complete financial dis-
ruption were not very favorable to long-term business commitments. 
All these factors explain that stock prices did not rise 
proportionately with commodity prices till 1952, when inflation seemed 
to level off. Such a lag may be observed again whenever inflat~on assu-
. ' . 
mes such proportions that it discourages investments instead of spurring 
them. Stockholders can afford to wait several years with the conviction 
that the adjustment between the price of their securities and the cost-
of-living will come sooner or later. But, for the holder of a bond in-
dexed on stock prices, the guaranty is of no value if the bond must be 
redeemed before .the indexation has had time to operate. 
b. Index of bond prices. 
Here again, no absolute rule can be set as to the corre-
lation between the variations of this index and those of the cost-of-li-
ving. Erratic spurts in supply or demand may make bond prices deviate 
from the course which general economic and financial conditions might i~ 
dicate . This was the case between 1939 and 1945, as was said before. 
(chart II) • However, the general rule is that bond prices will decline 
in times of inflation; while the inclusion of indexed bonds in the bond 
price index may limit the drop, it could not prevent it completely. 
From 1956 to 1958, the index of bond prices increased b,y only 1% and, in 
the case of the National Loan of 1956 this sluggishness partly neutralized 
the effect of a 13 . 7% increase in the stocks index. The use of an arith-
metic mean of the two indices , with their natural tendency to move in 
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contrary directions, in fact limits the guaranty gr.-anted to the bond-
holder. The index of stock prices alone, is used as reference for the 
indexation of the 5% 1957 bonds; however, the fact that the redemption 
premium alone is indexed makes the issue a poor inflation hedge . 
4. Economic indexations. 
Economic indices, as was said before., are expressed in 
terms of real quantities . They may show considerable increases over a 
period of time and their increase may yield bondholders important gains 
in capital and interest but there is little reason why they would show 
any correlation with the cost-of- living index. 
The 5% "Bonds for Industrial and Agricultural Equipment" 
issued in 1956 are indexed., as to their interest rate, on the variations 
of the general index of industrial production. The interest rate increa-
ses by 0. 05% for every percentage point increase in the index; a 22 point 
increase between 1955 and 1957 brought the interest from f . 500 to f . 610 
in 1958. The fact that the 22% increase in interest payments compensa-
tes for the depreciation of the currency during the corresponding period 
is pure~ accidental and does not prove that the indexation is a good 
inflation hedge . Since the index of industrial production is an econo-
mic index, based on volumes of production, not on sales revenue, there 
is no relation between its variations and those of the general price ~ 
dex. The only thing that may be said in its favor as a guaranty is that 
inflationary periods are . generally periods of great industrial activity, 
hence favourable to its increase . The limitation of indexation to inte-
rests alone further reduces the investment appeal of these 5% 1956 bonds. 
-84-
The 1952 bonds of the Charbonnages de France (nation-
alized coal mines) will be redeemed in 1959 with a premium of f .10 
per kilo of average increase in the 11 daily production per miner" 
bet ween 1952 and 1959 . The base being 1, 307 kilos and the 1958 le •el 
1699 kilos, the redemption value will probably be somewhere around 
f . l2,000, 20% above the f . lO, OO par-value of the bonds . Here again, 
it is clear that the increase of the index was not di rectly connected 
with the depreciation of the currency, although it happened to 
indemnify the bondholders for it . 
5 . Indexation on commodity prices 
Several nationalized industries have indexed t heir bonds 
on the price of the commodity or service they sell to the public; 
the coal mines on the wholesale price of coal, .the electric utility 
company on the price of the kilowatt hour, the railways on passenger 
fares, etc . The monetary character of this type of indices guarantees a 
certain relationship between the ir variations and those of the general 
price index. Yet, their tendency to move in the same direction does 
not guarantee that the variations will be of similar magnitu de . 
Prospectuses for the 1953, 1954, 1957, and 1958 i ssues 
of Charbonnages de France, all indexed on the price of coal, stree the 
strong degree of correlation between its movements and those of the 
general price index. One of them explains: 11made up for the greater 
part of salary expenses, coal ptices are intimately linked to the 
general price level11 • The assertion is confirmed by the statistics 
reproduced in chart v. None of these issues has yet been retired, but 
there are good reasons to think that the holders will have been 
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J Chart V 
Correlation or tne cost-of-living in~ex 
and of the cpal wholesale price index. I ct94&:19S9) 
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efficiently protected against depreciation of their capital when the 
1953 issue is redeemed in 1962. This will hold true unless the overpro-
duction recently discovered on the European market causes drastic re-
ductions in coal prices. 
Unfortunately, all commodity prices are not as beneficial 
to the bondholder as coal prices; this for various reasons: 
First, individual commodity prices are subject to influences 
independent of the overall variations in the purchasing power of the 
currency such as variations in supply and demand, te.chnological change, 
competition, etc. The cost~of-living index is but an average of individual 
commodity prices; its variations in one direction do not preclude variations 
of individual prices in the opposite direction. 
Prices are sometimes slow in adjusting to variations in 
the purchasing power of the currency. If its profit margin is high, a 
firm may even choose to absorb most of the increase in costs in order to 
maintain its volume of sales. 
As far as nationalized industries are concerned, the adjust-
ment may be delayed even longer. A private firm, if its profit margin is 
small, or if it is unwilling to reduce it, ~dll have to make customers 
bear the burden of increased costs of labor and material . In nationalized 
firms, the idea of profit is secondary and increased costs can be faced, 
if necessary, by re~orting to an increase in subsidies. This is what 
h~ppened in 1955 and 1956 when the government strove desperately to keep 
the cost-of-living index below the level at which it would have brought 
about a general wage increase. In all the areas where the government had 
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Compared evolutions of the cost-of-living index 
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some influence, prices were kept down through subsidization so as to 
compensate for increases in other areas. Such a policy is, of course, 
self-defeating since the increase in subsidies will bring more inflation 
and make it increasingly difficult to hold the line against . However, to 
delay and let others bear the burden of re~djusting was very often the 
only objective of the short-lived governments of the Fourth Republic. This 
factor certainly accounts for some of the distortions observed on chart 
VI, but the rapidity of reaction of the index to variations in the cost-
of-living index is important for bondholders lest their bonds are redeemed 
or amortized before the adjustment takes place. The 1954 bonds of the 
national railways, called for amortization in 1957, were redeemed at their 
par-value of f.lO,OOO although the currency had depreciated by 6%. Had 
the bonds been amortized one year later, their holders would have received 
f . l0,880, two years later f.l2,8oO. The date of issue and the date of 
redemption are very important in this case since the adjustment of the price 
to the rate of depreciation of the currency is not gradual but operated 
through stages of varying duration and amplitude. This can be shown by 
comparing the 1953 and 1954 issues of the National Railways . Both \.;ere 
subscribed to with francs of approximately the same purchasing pow~r . But 
the holders of the 1953 bonds profited from the fact that the issue was 
made in the first months of the year, before the May 15 rate increase. 
This explains the advantage they enjoyed over the holders of 1954 bonds 
both in interest payments and in redemption prices . 
Passenger(4Uu rates: 
To May 1 , 1953 
From May 15, 1953 to Jan. 5, 1958 
From Jan. 6, 1958 to Jan. 4, 1959 
Since Jan. 5, 1959 
f. 5-00 
II 6.25 
" 6.80 
II 8.00 
-~ 
The minimum interest payments on the bonds were f .45o for the 195) 
issue, f.600 for the 1954 issue . The interest and redemption prices paid 
on these bonds up to this date have been reproduced in Exhibit XII. 
Exhibit XII 
Interest and redemption payments 
on 195~ and 1954 issues of SNCF. 
195) issue 1954 issue 
Int Red em. Int Redem. 
• 
1954 56) 12,500 " n 
1955 56) 12,500 600 10,000 
1956 56) 12,500 600 10,000 
1957 56) 12,500 600 10,000 
1958 612 1),600 600 12,800 
Source: Services etudes economiques. 
Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas. 
Both indexations have more than guaranteed the bondholders 
against depreciation of the currency, provided that their bonds ere not 
amortized before 1959 · For a 22% increase in the cost-of-living index, 
holders of the 1954 bonds saw their capital increased by 28%, holders of 
the 195) bonds by 60%. 
The readjustments of the prices of gas and electricity 
operated at the beginning of 1959 may have somewhat similar effects on the 
capital of the bonds indexed on these prices. 
6 . Indexations on sales 
As was said in Chapter II, indexations on sales combine the 
advantages of an economic and a monetary index since interest and capital 
vary both vnth the volume of sales and with the price of the goods sold . 
Such indexations should be very favourable in times of inflation when prices 
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rise and business is booming. Volume and price increas~s, multiplying 
by one another make the index move in a geometric progression. For this 
reason, indexations on sales always provide for coef ficients of indexation 
lower than 1 . Yet, if prices of the products sold rise parallel to the 
cost of living, if the industry considered is in a phase of gro~~h, and 
if the borrowing firm holds its share of the market , indexations on sales 
can be a good inflation hedge . 
The 5% 1956 bonds of Saviem (Trucks) will be redeemed in 
1959 at f.l0,620: a 6.2% increase over their par value for a )1% increase 
in sales. 
The 6% 1954 bonds of the Groupement des Industries de la 
Construction electrique were redeemed in 1958 at f.l0,820, a 8 . 2% increase 
over the par value for an 82% increase in the saies of the electrical 
industry. 
A comparison of the 1955 and 1957 issues of the Regie 
Nationale des Usines Renault (cars) can help to realize some of the dangers 
of this type of indexation. 
The 1955 bonds, indexed on the 195) sales figure, will be 
redeemed'in 1959 at f.l1,690: a 16 .9% increase over the par value for an 
84 .5% increase in sales from 195) to 1957 • The sales figure taken in 
consideration is that of the last year but one preceding redemption or 
interest payment. 
An 89% increase in sales between the years 1955 and 1956 
brought the 1958 redemption value of the 1957 bonds to f.ll,780: an 17 . 8% 
increase over the par value . 
Thus, the rise in sales ~~s greater between 1955 and 1956 
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than between 195) and 1957• The danger for a bondholder is that his 
capital gain is always dependent upon the evolution of the industry. 
If the sales figure taken as a base were that of a peak year, and the one 
used to determine the redemption value of his bond that of a bad year, 
the indexation guarantee would b~ worth nothing to him. The same is true 
in the case of participating bonds indexed on dividends or earnings. 
7• Indexations on dividends and earnings 
The value of participating bonds as an inflation hedge cannot 
be set in general terms. If there is some reason to believe that business 
earnings , as a whole, will increase in times of inflation, this need not 
be the case for the earnings of one particular company. The value of the · 
guarantee depends finally on the success of the borrowing firm. 
The indexation on declared dividends is certainly the worst 
guarantee of all for the bondholders. Dividend disbursements in France 
tend to decrease in times of inflation when higher inventory and labor 
costs create working capital difficulties often solved by increased plough-
ing back of earnings. The desire to avoid high income taxes may lead to 
the same result. This is why this type of indexation, used several times . 
in the years 1925-1926, has not reappeared in more recent indentures. 
The indexation on both dividends and retained earnings gives 
a better guarantee. If the cash position of a company tends to deteriorate 
in times of inflation, its accounting profits will generally increase through 
the sale of low-cost inventories at increased prices; this will be true 
especially for firms using the FIFO method. In any case, the increase in 
the sales figure will increase the absolute volume of earnings assuming, 
of course, that the profit margin is kept stable; under the pressure of 
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competition, however, firms may be compelled to absorb part of the cost 
increases by reducing their profit margin. Moreover, since participating 
bonds carry coefficients of indexation well below one, the increase in the 
earnings index should be greater than the increase in the cost-of-living 
index if the security is to be a good inflation hedge. 
Finally, the value of the guarantee depends primarily on 
the rate of growth of company sales, both in volume and in price, and on 
the ability of the company to maintain its profit margin. 
Experience confirms these conclusions: 
The 1956, 5i% bonds of the Simca Company (cars) have 
registered no increase in interest or redemption value. This fact may be 
partly attributable to the high degree of competition characteristic of 
the automobile industry. 
The same is true of the 1954, 1955 and 1956 issues of 
Citroen (other car producer). In this case, however, the stability of the 
index is also attributable to the difficulties met by the firm in gaining 
acceptance for its new models. 
On the contrary, participating bonds have shown good records 
in faster growing industries where sales volumes increase at a higher rate 
and where competition is not so great. 
Ugine (electrometallurgy) registered a 66% increase in 
earnings between 1956 and 1957• Its 1957 6% participating bonds had a 
redemption value of f.ll,600 in 1958, 16% above par. The interest payment 
was of f.699, 16.5% above the f.6oo minimum. 
Pechiney (a leader in chemicals) registered a 66% increase 
in earnings between 1952 and 1958. The 1959 interest payment has been of 
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f.671, 22% above the f-550 minimum. The bonds called in for amortization 
in 1959 will be redeemed at f.l2,420, more than 24% above par . 
8. Conclusion 
The conclusion to this study of indexations as an inflation 
hedge is that none of the indices currently used can give the bondholder 
an absolute guaranty against the depreciation of his capital and revenues 
because none moves in true correlation ~dth the cost-of-living index. The 
fact that some indexations may never work is so plain that borrowers some-
times provide for this possibility by offering minimum redemption premiums 
or interest rates which increase automatically as time passes . 
Does this mean that indexations have no advantage for the 
bondholder? Certainly not. Some inJexed bonds have yielded their holders 
capital and interest gains which more than compensated for the effects of 
inflation. It only means that the investor must select an index&d bond 
as carefully as he would a common stock, considering all the variables of 
the case. He must in particular, estimate probable evolution of the irtdex 
and its bearing on the redemption value and interest payments. His claim 
~dll fluctuate much like that of a stockholder: the fact that a capital 
or interest aporeciation is never consolidated but questioned again every 
year with every change in the index, will make his position uncertain, even 
more so than that of a stockholder who can always wait to sell while the 
bondholder cannot avoid redemption of his bond even in an unfavorable period . 
Yet he enjoys the advantage over the stockholder i~ knowing that the redemp-
tion value of his bond will never be under par and thenarket value will 
seldom fall much below it. He has the advantage ove~ the holder of a non-
indexed bond of a potential profit,which is better than no profit at all. 
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Although they are not a perfect inflation hedge, indexed 
bonds can still attract investors who are unwilling to assume the risks 
involved in stock ownership or to suffer the capital losses which inflation 
inflicts upon holders of fixed income securities . 
Exhibit XIII 
Security issues 
(1951-1956) {Billions of francs) 
1951 1952 1953 
1) Stocks: •••••• •••••••••• 44 67 54 
2) Bonds. 
a. private firms: 
indexed bonds •••••• II It ~5 
convertible bonds •• 
" 
II It 
non-guaranteed bonds 19 7 9 
Total private issues 19 7 24 
b. nationalized firms: 
indemd bonds ••••••• II 31 48 
non-indexed bonds •• 25 10 50 
Total nat. firms iss . 25 41 98 
c. Local administrat.& 
war-victims groups •• 7 2 12 
d. Treasury borrowings. 
(short-term excepted) 
194 indexed bonds ••••••• n It 
non-indexed bonds 34 43 
Total Treasury borr. II 228 43 
RECAPITULATION 
Stocks ••••••••••••••••••• 44 67 54 
Indexed bonds •••••••••••• II 225 83 
Convertible bonds •••••••• " II It Non-guaranteed bonds ••••• 51 53 114 
Total security issues 95 345 231 
1954 1955 1956 Total 
80 110 120 475 
36 36 39 126 
II 7 9 16 
8 45 27 115 
44 88 75 257 
67 3 33 182 
75 110 ll7 387 
142 lJJ 150 569 
10 14 2 47 
.. II 403 591 
110 85 22 294 
110 85 425 891 
. 
80 llO 120 475 
103 39 475 925 
" 7 9 16 20.3" 254 168 843 
386 41Q "772 2,259 
• 
Source: Ministere des Finances. "Statistiques et etudes Financie-
res. 11 no. 105 Sept. 1957. 
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IV. Indexed bonds and the borrower 
A. Indexations and the volume of invested funds . 
The purpose of indexations was to increase the contribu-
tion of private capital to investment outlays by a~tracting more funds 
into the bond market . If the expected return from investments were 
assured private savings would be encouraged and finally balance investmmts. 
The preceding section demonstrated that indexed bonds could have some 
appeal to investors . The aim of the following pages 1f.Lll be to evaluate 
to what extent indexations attained the goal that had been assigned to 
them. This study will be based on statistics published by the Hinistry 
of Finances and reproduced in exhibit XIIIe Unfortunately, these sta-
tistics do not go beyond the year 1956. Some data pertaining to the years 
1957 and 1958 have been gathered from other sources#: because they did 
not seem to include the same items as the others and, for this reason, 
were not c~mparable, they have not been incorporated in Exhibit XIII . 
They will be used in the course of the discussion, however, as the occasion 
arises . 
The recovery of the French bond-market in the years follow-
ing 1952 has already been mentioned in the first part of this study 
(Exhibit VI. ) Since the irregularity of Government borrowings gives the 
year by year figures a fluctuating character, it may be better to average 
them by grouping them into equal periods of five years . In the period 
extending between 1947 and 1951, bond issues amounted to f . 473 billions; 
#''Bulletin Mensuel de Statistique" Feb. 1959, 11Banque11 Feb. 1959, and 
"Statistiques et Etudes Financieres 11 Aug. 1958. 
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from 1952 to 1956, they succeeded in raising f~l,733 billions, more than 
three and a half times the volume obtained during the preceding period. . 
Using statistics expressed in 1938 francs, so as to take into account the 
j 
depreciation of the currency, the figures become more significant and 
remain quite striking: 67 billions of those constant francs were raised 
between 1952 and 1956 against a volume of 26. 7 billions during the pre.-
ceding period. Far from depressing the market, this increase in the 
volume of bond-issues was accompanied by an increase in the price-index 
of debt securities·. 
Hith a total of f . 925 billions, indexed issues represented 
more than 53% of all the debt securities issued between 1952 and 1956. 
As the volume of the bonds issued between 1952 and 1956 had exceeded that 
of the bonds issued between 1947 and 1951 by 40 billions in terms of 
1938 francs, and since the total of the indexed issues floated between 
1952 and 1956 amounted to 36 billions of the same francs, it could be 
concluded that indexations were almost solely responsible for the re-
covery of the bond-market. Other factors came into play, however, that 
do not permit to draw such a clear-cut conclusion. 
1. monetary stability: 
The year 1952 opened a period of four years of financial sta-
bility during which price and wage increases were held in cheCk, tax rates 
were kept stable and budgets almost .balanced. The essential tasks of 
reconstruction and modernization were not forsaken, but the amount of funds 
included in the budget for these purposes was mo~e or less stabilized at 
the level reached in 1952 in spite of a steady increase in the national 
income. 
- 9S... 
Exhibit XIII 
Reconstruction and investment expenses 
included in the Budget 
(1945-1956) 
in millions of 1952 francs 
Years Expenses Years Expenses 
1945 76, 291 1951 351,295 
1946 278,854 1952 629,332 
1947 313,390 1953 700, 297 
1948 223 , 828 1954 664,020. 
1949 2Ll,343 1955 636, 792 
1950 250,731 1956 821,635 
Source: 11Annuaire Statistique de la France" . 
1957, p. 75 
A greater contribution of the bond-market to Government 
expenditures made possible a reduction in inflationary financing . Exhibit · 
XIV illustrates this point. It analyzes the sources from which the 
Government, in the years between 1953 and 1957, drew the funds necessary 
to meet the 11 impasse 11 • The notion of impasse is particular to French 
budgetary practices and requires some explanation. When Antoine Pinay 
introduced it for the first time in the Budget of 1952, his intention was 
to draw a sharp line bet'tveen those expenses to 'Which the State was com-
mitted and that would be covered with assured tax receipts , and the other 
expenses for which no counterpart existed in the resources of the Treasury. 
These 11 other expenses" would constitute the 11 impasse 11 ; they would be set 
aside in a special section of the Budget and considered as conditional; 
if the bond-market did not contribute enough funds to meet them, they would 
be curtailed accordingly. 
" In these conditions, the Treasury was led to wager every 
year on the volume and availability of private savings, 
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a wager similar to the one laid by the card player as 
to the presence or absence, in the hand of the next 
player, of a card superior to the one he is going to 
play. "* 
The word 11impasse 11 is the French equivalent for the 11finesse 11 used 
in the game of bridge. Unfortunately, the revision of estimates tb,at 
should be made whenever Treasury borrowings cannot meet the expenses 
proved difficult to operate except on rare occasions when energetic 
cabinets dared to try it. Host of the time, when the Treasury lost its 
wager, the gap between the estimated borrowings and the funds actually 
contributed by the bond-market was filled with new monetary issues~ De-
vised as a means to ensure financial stability, the 11 impasse 11 had been 
turned into. a source of inflation. 
From 1952 to 1956, however, the impasse was kept within reasonable 
limits and was financed without excessive inflation. The contribution of 
private savings increased f rom year to year (Title I of exhibit) till 
1956, and permitted to reduce the volume of funds to be obtained from 
"monetary sources 11 (Title III) , that is to say through inflation. Banks ' 
holdings of Treasury Bonds decreased considerably until 1955 and the 
Government was even able to repay some of the loans ("advances") previously 
granted by the Bank of France . Thus, there were at least four years , 
between 1952 and 1955, during which monetary inflation through Government 
deficits, although not completely mastered, was closely held in check. 
Perhaps more important than the actual financial and budgetary record 
of those four years was the psychological atmosphere created by the nPinay 
experience" . 
~~ 13, p . 1 
I . 
II . 
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Exhibit XIV 
Financi, of the "yrr.eassett 
1953-1957 
billion francs 
1953 1954 
Contribution of Erivate 
savings: 
- Loans: 23 73 
195.5 
91 
- Treasury Bonds __2!t 138 _ill 
Total (I) : 117 211 230 
Miscellaneous sources : 278 289 338 
(correspondants) 
III .Monetary sources: 
- Treasury bonds held by 
banks: 76 63 28 
- Postal checking accts . 52 8.5 69 
- Advances from the Bank 
of France: 228 -65 - lll 
- Miscellaneous: 
....:22 81 108 
Total (III) : 257 l'b4 94 
Grand Total (Impasse) 652 664 662 
1956 19.57 . 
403 84 
-Wa .l:QZ 0 191 
314 219 
117 11 
119 43 
-71 4.52 
15 ~* 1.80 31 
1,004 1,041 
*Including funds from _the International Monetary Fund. 
Source : ''Rapport des Experts sur la setuation Financiere11 
AGEFI . Dec . 30, 1958. 
Voluntary price reductions were obtained from producers and 
retailers; in areas where profit margins were found excessive, imports were 
financed or new marketing methods -- industrial meat packing, for example 
were encouraged by the Government so as to force prices down. If these 
measures did not always bring about the expected results, they at least 
succeeded in stabilizing the cost-of-living index and this stabilization 
made it possible to reject demands for wage increases . But above all, by 
asserting its will to defend the purchasing power of the currency, the 
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Government was creating the myth of a "franc Pinay11 , worthy successor 
to Napoleon ' s 1!franc Germili.al11 or to the shorter-lived 11franc Poincarre" 
of the late 1920 ' s and early-1930 ' s . Some critics now deny that the Pinay 
experience ever obtained the confidence of the public . The fall of the 
. dollar on the free market from f . 483 in February, 1952 to f . 389 in June 
of the same year proves at least that the speculation on the fall .of the 
franc had subsided. This confidence was kept alive even after the fall 
of the Pinay Government in 1953 and, for four years, many Frenchmen lived 
in the illusion that the new equilibrium was there to stay. 
Just as the "inflationary psychosis 11 of the postwar years 
had discouraged savings and investments, the restoration of confidence 
was going to reverse the trend. Life insurance companies saw the volume 
of premiums increase from 33 billions in 1951 to 70 billions in 1955 (both 
figures in constant 1952 francs) . * On the bond~arket, the average yield 
of 11perpetual Rentes" decreased from 6.44% in 1951 to 5. 23% in 1956 . ~f* 
Since the yields on indexed bonds are not included in this average , it can 
be seen that monetary stability had an effect of its own on the bond-market, 
independent of indexations . 
2. increased savings : 
Apart from the confidence factor, the formation of private 
savings was encouraged during those years by an absolute increase in 
personal disposable . income . (~ibi t XV) 
Expressed in constant 1952 francs, the figures in Exhibit 
XV sh9w that personal income increased steadily from 1952 to 1956, not only 
* 18, p . 7 
·:HI- 18, p . 86 
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in terms of the number of monetary units but also in terms of purchasing 
power. As a percentage of personal income, direct taxes remained relatively 
· stable: 2. 46% in 1952, 2. 98% .in 1953, 2. 76% in 1954, 2. 55% in 1955 and 
3. 04% in 1956~ This stability of the tax burden permitted an absolute 
increase in disposable income - - after taxes and social security payments 
as appears in the Exhibit . 
. 
Exhibit XV 
Personal Income , Disposable Income 
Household savings and expenditures 
(1952-1956) 
billions of 1952 francs 
1952 1953 1954 
l . Personal Income 10,387 10,969 12,058 
- Less:direct taxes 236 327 334 
- Less: Social Security: 
(self-employed, etc •• ) 41 65 69 
2. Disposable Income: 10, 110 10, 577 11, 655 
- Less:consumption exp 9, 349 9,921 10,745 
- Less : expenses abroad 
(tourism, transfers) 119 133 143 
- Less: misc . transfers 
(gifts, bequests, etc .) ___12 78 6a 
3. Savings : 547 445 703 
1955 1956 
:I-3,208 13,999 
338 426 
72. 82 
12,795 
11,670 
13,491 
12,336 
156 165 
72 1a 
894 916 
Source: 11Annuaire Statistique de la France 11 , p. 374 (1957) 
Although it decreased markedly after 1954, the marginal 
propensity to save was positive throughout the period except for the year 
1953 . It reached a high of 0. 24 in 1954, then decreased to 0. 17 in 1955 
and 0. 03 in 1956. After seven years of high consumption; spurred by a 
desire to regain the prewar level of living and to outrun price increases, 
French households were once again able to save . The higher return from 
investments in the securities market, in life insurance policies, in 
savings accounts, etc . , encouraged them to do so . The high propensity 
to save observed in the years 1954 and 1955 may also be explained by 
people's belief that tinancial stabilization would be followed by de-
flation and that consumption expenditures could be advantageously post-
pone d. 
Whatever the cause, private savings increased steadily from 547 billion 
francs in 1952 to 916 billions in 1956. It is highly probable that this 
increase in the volume of loanable funds would have had some influence on 
the bond-market even in the absence of indexations . 
3. tax exemptions vs . indexations: 
Government and nationalized industries played an important part 
in the bond-market ~oth before and after 1952. From 1952 to 1956, their 
issues of indexed bonds represented almost 8a~ of all the indexed issues 
and more than 43% of the total issues of debt-securities . Yet, these 
11public11 issues were not only appealing because of their :indexations but 
also because of the important tax exemptions they carried. In many cases 
it is difficult to appreciate vJhether investors responded more to the fiscal 
advantages or to the indexation guaranty • 
. 
The 1952, ~% Rente (Pinay Loan), for example, carried full exemption 
from the Income tax as well as from gift and inheritance taxes for the 
entire duration of the Loan. It was also exempt from all spe·cial taxes on 
securities . The 1958, .21% Rente carries the same advantages . 
Interest paid on the 1956, 2% Bonds is deductible for the first five 
years, for income tax purposes . So is the redemption premium, for the 
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entire duration of the Loan. The 19.57, 2_% Bonds carry the same features . 
The deductibility of interest payments and redemption pre -
miums for income tax purposes has not been limited to the issues of the 
Treasury but was granted by law to individual bond-issues floated by 
public borrowers, i . e . nationalized industries , state- controlled firms , 
local administrations, etc . 
Practically all the issues of 11S. N. c .F. " (French Railways) 
have been granted this privilege . The same is true of other bonds issued 
by various railway companies in the overseas territories, by gas and 
electric utility companies in France and in the colonies, by war-victims 
associations, etc . 
If tax-exemptions existed before 19.52, it seems that, after 
that date , they were granted to more important borrowers than in the past. 
The evolution corresponded to the Government ' s intention to see nationalized 
industries finance their operations through borrowing rather than through 
the State Budget. Thus, the first tax-exempt bonds of Electricite de 
France (electric utility) were issued in 19.50, the first tax-exempt bonds 
of Charbonnages de France (coal mines) in 19.52 . Between 19.52 and 19.56 these 
two organizations alone issued more than f . l82 billions worth of bonds , 
almost 9% of the total volume of debt securities issued during this period. 
Tax-exemptions cannot fail to have an influence on the terms 
of an issue and on how it is received by investors . For example , it is 
clea:r that the low interest rate of the 19.52 and 19.58 .J.t% nRentes 11 could 
not be justified by the indexation alone which was, as we have already 
explained of doubtful value . The exceptional tax advantages attached to 
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the securities -- no other issue ever carried more ~- weighed certainly 
as heavily in the decision of the subscribers . In short, whenever an 
indexed issue is considered, one must try to deterrrQne what part 
indexation and tax advantages -- if any - - played in its success . 
The conclusion to the preceding paragraphs is that the 
f . 925 billion worth of indexed bonds issued'between' 1952 and 1956 cannot 
be considered as having been subscribed because of indexations alone . The 
atmosphere of confidence and the relative financial stability which pre-
vailed during these four years, the net increase in the volume of loanable . 
funds and the numerous tax advantages granted also had some influence on 
the mobilization of private savings . 
In reality, all these factors were so closely linked that 
it is difficult to determine exactly the particular contribution of every 
one of them. For example, it is clear that indexations and tax exe~tions 
contri~uted to the financial stabilization and to the increase in private 
savings : because they attracted more funds into the bond-market, the 
Government was able to balance its budget better, reduce its recourse to 
inflationary means of financing, and abstain from increasing taxes& In 
turn, the reduction of the t~ burden permitted the accumulation of private 
savings which, associated with the growing confidence created by monetary 
stability increased the volume of investments on the bond-market. \ihile 
the French economy had been caught, until 1952, in a vicious circle --
inflation reducing savings and the reduction in savings causing more 
inflation -- it seemed that the reversal of the trend had brought a chain 
of reactions towards ~rovement. It was still difficult to establish 
exactly what particular factor had started the process or what particular 
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influence each one had had on the final result . Thus it seems that the 
importance of indexations cannot be set in terms of precise figures; 
their contribution to the recovery of the bond-market cannot be equated 
to the total volume of the funds obtained through the issue of indexed 
bonds and must be estimated with the help of roundabout methods . 
3. the use of indexations : 
The reluctance of borrowers to grant indexation guaranties is 
the best indication we have that such guaranties do attract into the bond-
market funds that would not be invested otherwise . Indexations are costly 
for borrowers , depriving them of some of the profits they could expect 
to draw from inflation without even bringing substantial decreases in 
interest rates . It is thus logical to expect that indexations will not 
appear in bond indentures unless investors really set them as a condition 
to their lending . The following paragraphs \·rl.ll attempt to illustrate this 
point and to show the relationship that exists between the use of indexa-
tions and the general attitude of the bond~rket, the proportion of 
indexed bonds tending to increase whenever investors show signs of lesser 
receptivity. It is certainly impossible to draw general rules and signi-
ficant correlations from a six-years old experience . The available data 
may, however, be used as a basis for some conjectures . 
a . Indexations and monetary stability 
Since indexations were devised as a means to counteract the 
influence of inflation on the bond-market, the first idea that comes to 
mind is that of relating the volume of indexed issues to the general 
financial and monetary situation; as investors become more confident in 
• 
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the future of the currency, the need for .indexations diminishes and more 
bonds of the classic type are issued. If, on the contrary, Government 
policies show inflationary tendencies, the subsequent softening of the 
bond-market compels borrowers to reduce the volume of their issues or to 
bolster their sales of securities by granting investors such advantages 
that will overcome their reluctance . 
Exhibit XVI seems to corroborate this hypothesis . Treasury 
borrovdngs have been excluded here because their fluctuations in volume 
would distort the year-by-year statisticse Concentrating our attention. 
on the bonds issued by all other long-term borrowers, that is to say 
private firms, nationalized industries and local administrations, we notice 
that the precentage of indexed bonds to the total volume of issues declined 
sharply between 1952 and 1955, through four years of financial stability 
and growing public confidence. 
1952 
1953 
i954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
Exhibit XVI 
Indexed bonds as percentage 
of total bond issues 
All borrowers, Treasgyr excepted 
( 195'1-195' 
Total issues Classic type Indexed bonds 
billion f . of bonds billion f . 
billion f . 
48 17 31 
122 59 63 
186 83 103 
201 162 39 
225 153 72 
228 73 155 
187 71 116 
Indexed 
as % of 
total 
64.5% 
51.6% 
55.3% 
19.4% 
32. a,g 
67.9% 
61.0% 
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On the contrary, after 1955, when it became evident that . 
the Government was experiencing insuperable difficulties in balancing its 
budget, and that it was once more obliged to resort to iriflation in order 
to meet its expenses, investors became more unwilling to commit their 
funds and the percentage of indexed bonds rose again till 1958 . 
The year 1957 is a good example to judge the correlation 
between inflation and the use of indexed bonds . The budgetary "impasse" 
amounted to f . l041 billions, 43% of which were financed through direct 
advances of the Bank of France . The consequences of this monetary inflation 
on the bond market can be evaluated from the figures given in the Report 
of the National Credit Council for the year 1957:* 
Nationalized industries indexed 60% Qf their bonds instead 
of 22% in 1956 and 2. 7% in 1955. 
Only 2% of the bonds issued by private firms were of the 
classic type . The rest were either indexed (79%) or convertible into 
commo~ stock (19%) , i . e . more or less protected against inflation. In 
spite of these guaranties, private bond issues fell from f . 84 billions in 
1955 and f . 74 billions in 1956 to only f . 59 billions in 1957 . 
As for local administrations and associations of war-victims , 
after i~suing an average f . l2 billions worth of bonds between 1953 and 1955, 
they lirr~ted their borrowing to f . 2 billions in 1956 and 1957. The report 
of the National Cre9it Council interprets the fact in the following state-
ment: 
* 3 
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n The issues of local administrations were 
of limited importance; these institutions 
have lit tle access to the financial market · 
for want of the po1-rer to index their bonds . 
A Law of Harch 29, 19.58 has finally au-
thorized them to do so."* 
The conclusion is clear: in 19.57 inflation was once more 
disrupting the bond-market, discouraging investors and causing borrowers 
to reduce the volume of their issues or to give lenders the necessary 
guaranties . 
b . Indexations and the volume of long- term borrowing 
Inflation alone cannot account for all the fluctuations in 
the use of indexations . Exhibit XVII, where Treasury borrowings are, 
included, shows that , from 19.56 to 19.57 , indexed bonds actually decreased 
as a percentage of total bond issues in spite of the rapid deterioration 
of the financial situation. There may be several reasons for this 
deviation from the logical relationship between inflation and t he use of 
indexations . The most apparent is the decrease in the total volume of 
bond-issues from f . 6.52 billions in 19.56 to f .4l4 billions in 19.57 . At a 
time when inflation increased private savings -- in t eriilS of monetary units 
if not in terms of purchasing power -- this reduction in long-term borrowing 
set the supply of securities at a level more in keeping with the volume 
of loanable funds, making it unnecessary for borrowers to attract investors 
with such advantages as indexations, tax exemptions, convertibility features, 
etc . Or maybe it ~ras the other way around and borrowers had decided to 
curtail their e~enses and reduce the volume of their issues rather than 
* 3 
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grant the above mentioned advant~ges . Whatever the correct answer to 
this problem, the experience of the year 1957 and the data in· Exhibit 
XVIII indicate a relationship between the use of indexations and the total 
volume of bond issues as a percentage of private savings . Such a rela-
tionship is worth commenting upon as it throws some light on the working 
of the bond market and also on some particular aspects of indexation. 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
Exhibit XVII 
Indexed bonds as percentage of 
total bond issues . All borrowers 
(1952 -1957) 
Total bond issues Indexed is sues Indexed issues as 
in billions f . in billions f . a% of total 
278 225 81. 0% 
197 83 42 . 0% 
3o6 103 33 . 6% 
300 39 13 . 3% 
652 475 73 . 8% 
414 239 57 . 7% 
It is clear that the bond market depends for itssupply of 
loanable funds on the existing accumulation of private savings. If more 
bonds are issued than there are available savings , bond prices will decline 
or the purchase of securities will have to be financed through bank credit 
as sometimes happens -- thus generating inflation. Not even all private 
savings are available for investment in the bond market. A certain pro-
portion will generally be invested in such assets as real estate, personal 
property, common stock, etc . The public apportions its balances between 
these various investments according to the expected return. The success 
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of bond issues and the strength of the bond market thus depend on a 
double set of decisions made to the public : the decision as to the 
appor~ionment of their funds between consumption and savings , and another 
decision as to. the investment of savings in bonds or in other types of . 
assets . 
Given a certain yolume of savings , it appears that there 
is a minimum belO"VI which investments in bonds will not fall ., This minimum 
corresponds to the contribution of institutional investors obliged by law 
to invest a certain percentage of their funds in debt securities and com-
pared also to the contribution of some private investors unable or unwillL~g 
to assume the risks and cares involved in real estate or stock ownership ., 
If borrowers limit the volume of their issues to this minimum, they will 
not have to grant any .special advantage to a public satisfied with a minimurn 
rate of interest . However, as soon as· they increase their issues above 
this minimum, they must make them attractive enough to compete with other 
types of investments . As soon as all private savings have been absorbed, 
borrowers , must encourage lenders to revise, not only their plans for 
investment, but also their decisions as to the apportionment of their in-
come between consumption and investments: in other words , the larger the 
volume of private savings to be attracted into the bond market, the greater 
the resistance of lenders and the necessity for borrowers to make sacrifices . 
A high level of interest rates is not the only way to at-
tract more funds into the bond market; especially in times of war, when 
heavy borrowings tended to depress bond prices and bring prohibitive interest 
rates , cabinets have used tax exemptions as a means to strengthen the market 
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and make it absorb more securities . It seems that, in recent years, 
French borrowers have used index~tions somewhat in the s~e manner. 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
Exhibit XVIII 
Correlation between the use·of indexations 
and the total volume of bond issues as re-
lated to total private savings 
(1952-1956) 
Private Total bond Bond issues Indexed bonds 
savings issues as.% of pri- as % of total 
bill. i' . bill.f. vate savings bond issues 
547 278 . 50. 8% 80. 9% 
432 197 45. 6% 42 . 1% 
670 306 45. 6% 33 . 6% 
860 300 34. 8% 13 . 3% 
907 652 71. 8% 73 . 8% 
It is easy to understand the influence which heavy public 
borrowing has had on the entire bond market. Because public issues are 
safer -- the State itself cannot default and the issues of nationalized 
firms · are Sta'lie-guaranteed -- and almost ahJays accompanied, with tax 
exemptions, these issues have priority over those of private firms . Rel-
egated to the position of marginal borrowers , private issuers must be 
satisfied with whatever fl.Ulds are left over or try to attract more by 
making their bonds participating or convertible . This eXplains that, in 
.many of +he years under study, private borrowers indexed a breater per-
centag of their issues than did public borrowers . (Exhibit XIX) 
In 1954,· for example, a sudden increase in Treasur.i issues 
\ 
and in the issues of nationalized firms compelled private borrowers to 
index 82% of their own bonds . In this case it is quite evident that 
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indexations and convertible features were made necessary because of 
excessive supply of securities that softened the market, not because 
of inflation which was actually on the wane . The Treasury itself m~, 
in its borrowing, go so far over the normal capacity of the market.' tha.t 
tax advantages will not suffice to attract investors and that indexations 
will have to come into play. This is wha. t happened, for example , in 1956 
when the Government alone floated issues amounting to 46% of the private 
savings of 'the year . In that case, however, an inflationary psychosis 
undoubtedly contributed to the softening of the market, inasmuch as 
heavy Government borrowings are an unmistakable sign of financial dif-
ficulties and, as will be seen later, a source of inflation. The 
consequence was indexation by the Treasury of 95% of its issues. 
Exhibit x:rx 
Total bond issues per class of borrowers 
and percentage of indexed bonds in each class 
(Volumes of issues in billions .of francs) 
Treasury issues Nationalized Local Private issues 
Firms Administr 
Total Index Total Index Total* Total In de~ 
(bill . f) (%) (bill. f) (%) (bill. f) (bill. f) (%)* 
1951 . II n 25 It 1 19 • 
1952 228 85% 41 76% 2 1 It 
1953 43 It 98 49% 12 24 63% 
1954 110 n 142 47% 10 44 82% 
1955 85 It 113 3% 14 88 49% 
1956 425 95% 150 22% 2 15 64% 
1957 108 78% 169 66% 2 59 '98% 
* Local administrations and associations of war-victims (both 
* included) were not authorized to index their issues til 1958. 
* Inc~uding convertib~e bonds. 
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In years of su·ch heavy public borrowing, private issuers 
have no other aLternative but to forsake their own issues or to follow 
the Treasury in its indexation policy. In 19521 when indexed and 
convertible bonds were not yet used by private borrowers, the volume of 
their issues fell to f.7 billions, instead of f.l9 billions in the preced-
ing year. In this case, however, part of the decrease could be attributed 
to the deflationary policy followed by the Government and to the impact 
of this policy on business activit,y. From 1955 to 1956 private issues 
fell by only f . l3 billions in spite of important public borrowings . But 
the percentage of indexed issues increased from 49% to 64%. 
The conclusion to the preceding paragraphs is that indexa-
tions can be used to strengthen the market, not only against the effects 
of inflation but also against the softness caused by an excessive supply 
of securities. This idea might be attacked on the ground that indexations 
cannot be an incentive to invest unless inflation is there to cause them 
to operate. Such. an objection is obviouslY erroneous in the case of most 
'indices used by private and nationalized firms (sales, profits, dividends, 
productivity, output), all of which can fluctuate independently from the 
purchasing power of the currency. If it seems more valid in the case of 
Treasury issues, which make use of indices more closely linked to monetary 
fluctuations, it is only because, in this case, excessive borrowings and 
inflation are almost always synonymous, as we propose . to show later. In 
a~ case, the data given have proved, in our opinion, that indexations 
were not granted by borrowers haphazardly but onlY in cases when the 
softness of the market, for one reason or another, seemed to make them 
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necessar,y for the success of the issue. This alone is a proof that 
they attracted into the market more funds than would have been invested 
o ther\vise. 
Indexations and the evolution of bond-prices. 
Bond-price indices 
An analysis of the evolution of bond-prices since 1952 
may help to appreciate the contribution of indexations to the strengthen-
ing of the bond-market . At the outset it is, however, necessary to 
emphasize the many limitations of a statistical study in this field. 
First, the data published by the National Institute of 
. Statistics do not distinguish between bonds of a classic type .and indexed 
bonds, except for the issues of nationalized industries. 
Second, the indices published include but a sample of the 
various bonds outstanding; yet, indexed bonds are of such varied types 
and qualities that it is always dangerous to draw general conclusions 
from a few individual cases. Also, one particular issue may be given 
such a weight in an index that its price fluctuations will completely 
conceal fluctuations in the opposite direction undergone by smaller issues. 
It is necessary, for this reason, to be aware of what every index in-
cludes or leaves aside, and of what weight is given to each single issue 
in the calculation of the index. 
Third, and maybe most dangerous for the analyst, the 
methods of calculation of the indices are frequently changed. The bond 
market is in a state of constant evolution. Old issues are redeemed; 
amortized or refunded, new issues are floated with different features and 
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rates of interest. In a few years, the market m~ change so completely 
that the averages used to picture its evolution are no longer representative. 
Statisticians are then obliged to change the composition of their indices 
and this revision may be so complete that the new data are no longer com-
parable with the old ones. The composition of the bond-price indices 
published by the National Institute of St.atistics has changed twice since 
1949: in 1955, for example, the General index (shown in the first column 
of Exhibit XX) was revised to include several securities recently issued. 
Any attempt to analyze its evolution without taking into account the 
inclusion of the Pinay "Gold Loan" in the revised index would lead to 
serious misinterpretations • . For all these reasons, the following discus-
sion will be very cautious and perhaps not as conclusive as we would like 
to see it 
General 
Index 
(I) 
1950 99. 8 
1951 101. 4 
1952 111.2 
1953 113. 6 
1954 116. 4 
1955 127. 0 
1956 132. 0 
1957 
-1958 128. 3 
Exhibit XX 
Indices of bond-prices 
1949: lOO 
3% Other Govt National 
Rentes securities Industries 
non-index. 
(II) (III) (IV) 
98. 2 99 .5 103. 2 
97 . 9 99 .5 105. 3 
113 . 9 104 108. 3 
117. 2 104. 5 110 ~ 3 
117 . 7 106. 7 113.9 
122. 6 115.5 122. 4 
118. 6 116. 2 121.1 
- - -113.3 112. 1 109. 8 
National Private 
Industr . issues 
indexed 
(V) (VI) 
99~3 101. 4 
115~9 99 . 2 
137. 1 102 . 8 
142. 3 106~ 1 
153. 2 111. 4 
188.6 120. 9 
228.1 119. 5 
- -241.6 107.1 
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All the data reproduced in Exhibit XX use 1949 as the 
base year. A quick glance at them enables us to see that the average 
price of debt securities rose steadily from 1950 to 1954, in all sectors 
of the bond market; Government, nationalized industries and private firms. 
However, this increase cannot be attributed, at least not directly, to 
the influence .of indexations: the only indexed bonds outstanding in 1949, 
when the indices were first published, were the "indemnity bonds" given 
to the former stockholders of nationalized industries. Considered 
separately in the fifth column of the Exhibit, under the title "Indexed 
bonds of Nationalized Industries", these · indemnity bonds are also included 
in the "General Index" (I) with a weight of 10%. But it was not until 
1955 that the various indices were revised to include the numerous indexed 
issues floated since 1952. 
Does this mean that indexations had no influence, whatsoever, 
in the genera~ rise of bond prices observed in the indices from 1950 to 
19541 Certainly not. The bond market is not divided into impervious 
compartments . Its various parts are, in many respects, related and the 
strengthening of one important sector - especially that of Government bonds -
will always ve an influence upon the others. Although tiiere is no way 
. 
to prove it, it is highly probable that indexed issues -- the Pin~ Loan 
in particular -- consolidated the entire bond-market or, at least, did not 
depress it as much as they would have if they had been issued without the 
indexation guaranty. 
The rapid rise in Index (V) deserves a particular mention. 
It certainly contributed to the popularity of indexation clauses and dispelled 
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· some of the coolness with which they had been initially received. The 
former stockholders of the nationalized gaz and electric utilities and 
coal mines who had hastily sold their indemnity bonds soon after recei-
ving them, certainly regretted their action later, as they witnessed the 
price evolution reproduced on ~ibi t XXI. With exceptionally favourable 
features indemnity bonds had an outstanding record and were an excellent 
publicity for the indexed issues that were floated afterwards, very few 
of which really repeated their prowesses . 
Exhibit XXI 
Market-price evolution of indemnity bonds 
(1949-1959) 
On Dec .31 Caisse nationale Charbonnages 
de 1•Energie.* de FrancelH} 
1949 .. 5,170 
1950 6, 690 5,505 
1951 10,490 7, 585 
1952 10, 400 7,200 
1953 12, 440 7, 500 
1954 14, 505 8, 000 
1955 17, 750 10,250 
1956 19,500 12.,58o 
1957 
- -
1958 
- -1959~Hf* 22 , 450 12,000 
* Bonds given to former stockholders of nationa-
lized Gaz and electric utilities. 
-» Bonds given to former stoc kholders of nationa-
lized coal mines . 
-:f-::-* March 31. 
Bond-price indices were revised in 1955. This revision . 
brought about the following results: 
- Starting in 1955, index (I) included indexed bonds in 
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a proportion of more than 46%: The Pinay 11 Gold Loan" alone was given 
a weight of 34% and indemnity bonds, one of 12 .1%. 
- The Pinay Loan was also · i ncluded in Index (III) with 
a weight of 62%. 
- Index (V) was revised to include the indexed "production 
shares" of "Electricite de France" in a proportion of 10%. 
- As far as we know, Index (VI) was not modified and 
consequently, does not include any participating or convertible bond. 
Keeping these facts in mind, it is interesting to compare 
the evolution of the various indices during the recent inflationary 
period of the years 1956-1958. Heavily weighted with indexed bonds --
the Pinay Loan in particular -- Indices (I) and (III) moved more slug-
gishly and kept on rising from 1955 to 1956 when indices (II), (IV) and 
(VI) already ~d begun to decline. When indices (I) and (III) began to 
decline with the rest to reach their low in April 1958, their fall was 
not percentage-wise as great. As for index (V) -- indemnity bond -- its 
rise was not stopped but, on the contrary, accelerated, as inflation re-
appeared. 
Exhibit XXII shows ~he percentage decline of the various 
indices between 1955, last year of monetary stability, and April, 1958. 
The figures in Exhibit XXII show that tt.e indices that 
included same proportion of indexed bonds (I,III, V) withstood the test 
of inflation and crisis much better than the others . This general impression 
must yet be. qualified in several respects . 
As far as Government bonds are concerned, a comparison of 
indices (lii) and (II) gives more credit to indexations than they really 
deserve, and this for several reasons : 
-120-
First, the Pinay Loan included in Index (III) carried 
tax exemptions that accounted for its stabilit,r at least as much as 
the indexation guaranty . 
Second, t~ 3% Rentes of Index (II) are, traditionally, 
the most volatile of all debt securities, being "perpetual", that is 
without maturicy date . They may, for this reason, fall way below par 
while other government issues are held closer to par value by the prospect 
of possible amortization. 
Exhibit XXII 
The fall of bond prices from 1955 to April 1958 
1955 1958 
Indices (year's (April's % 
average) average) change 
(I) General 127.0 123.9 
- 2.44% 
(II) 3% Rentes 122.6 100.9 ... 17. 69% 
(III) Other Govt . Sec . ll5.6 108. 7 5. 88% 
(IV) Nationalized Indus-
tries (non-indexed) 122.4 107.1 -12.50% 
(V) Nationalized Indus-
188.6 123.53% tries (indexed) 233. 0 
(VI) Private bonds 120.9 103.7 -14.22% 
As far as the bonds of nationalized industries are con-
cerned, the difference in the evolution of indices (IV) and ( V) is some;. 
what exaggerated by the fact that the latter was made up almost exclusively 
of indemnity bonds, the 11pick of tte crop" , so to speak, of all indexed 
issues. 
The decline in Index (VI) is not conclusive, as far as we 
are concerned, since the index did not include aqr indexed bonds . 
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V . Economic and financial impact of indexations 
What has been said of indexations tended to prove the 
importance of their contributionto the recovery of the bond-market and 
to the financial stabilization of 1952. But, when inflation flared up 
again in 1956-1958 and led the countr.y to one of the most severe finan-
cial crises it had ever experienced, these same indexations were made 
largely responsible for the extent of the resulting damage . This app~en~ 
contradiction must be clarified. The purpose of this last chapter will 
be to ascertain the real economic and financial impact of indexations 
and to determine whether they can cure inflation or only make it mare 
explosive . 
1. Stabilizing effects of indexations . 
Much has already been said about the stabilizing effects of 
indexations. It will suffice to recall them briefly: 
First, indexations have a definite appeal for investors and 
may induce them to dishoard some of their riches in order to invest them 
in the bond market. They may also encourage them to save more, thereby 
• 
redu,cing the high propensity to consume which is, at the same time, an 
effect and a source of inflation. 
Second, as consumption expenditures decline, investment in 
consumer goods industries should decline also .and private borrowers should 
cease to compete with the Govermaent and other public borrowers in the 
market for loanable funds . Besides, if private firms want to borrow, they 
cannot compete with public borrm~ers unless they are ready to pay very 
high interest rates or make use of indexed, participating or convertible 
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bonds . In the first case, high costs of financing will endanger their 
competitive position in the international ma~ket; in the second case they 
lose their hopes that monetary depreciation may reduce the burden of their 
debt . In both cases, their propensity to invest will lose its speculati ve 
motives and be reduced to the level justified by economic activity. 
Third, the combination of an increase in savings and a 
decrease in private borrowings enables the State to borrow more from the 
public. The consequences are .twofold: 
First, an increase in the debt-financing of Gove~nment 
expenditures permits to reduce, or at least stabilize, the volume of fisca l 
levies . Inflationary pressures are thereby relieved since corporate taxes 
tend to be shifted to consumers in the form of higher prices. Besides, 
the substitution of savings for taxes as a means to finance State expenses 
is highly desirable when these expenses are not the current expenses of 
Government services but the investment expenses of productive services: 
there is no reason why the tax-payer should finance the French railroads 
or electric utilities; it is for the consumer to bear the cost of their 
investments . 
Second, the state being able to finance its budgetary deficits 
through borrowing, the need for inflationary financing, is thereby reduced 
loans from the public replace those previously obtained from the banking 
system. 
Finally, inasmuch as indexations permit a reduction in the 
rates of interest, they should reduce the costs of financing of both public 
and private borrowers; this reduction should result in lower taxes and lower 
prices . 
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2 . Financial dangers of indexations . 
At the same time, however , a situation is created which is 
full of dangers for the future for, if inflation reappears, the Government 
and other borrowers will have to face substantial increases in the burden 
of their debt. To give but one example: in six years, the French Rail-
roads have seen the redemption value of their 195) bond issues increase 
from f . l682 billions to f.2 ,691 billions . Simultaneously yearly interest 
payments rose from f.lOl millions to f . l21 millions . 
Such increases must be financed in one way or another . In 
the case of Government borrowings, they can be financed only through tax 
increases or through borrowings from the banking system, both sources have 
a definite inflationary potential . When the debt is that of nationalized 
industries, the increase in the financial burden will have to be financed 
through subsidies, thereby increasing the budgetary deficit, or through 
rates increases which will contribute to the rise of the cost-of-living 
index . As for private firms, their tendency will be to pass on to consumers 
their increased costs of financing . Even in the case where competition 
does not permit them to do so, the deduction of such costs for tax-payment 
purposes will result in lower revenues for the Government. 
In other words, the use of indexations has been justified 
as a psychological manoeuvre to attract investors into the bond-market, 
but once indexations had been granted , one had to make sure that they would 
never have to operate. The year 1952 should have marked the opening of an 
era of financial stability . Unfortunately, M. Pinay himself and the several 
Premiers who came after him did not have sufficient power to carry-out this 
task of financial reorganization and to force an austerity program upon the 
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Nation. At the same time, the isolation of the French economy from the 
rest of the world prevented indexations from producing their stabilizing 
effects and turned them instead into aggravating factors. This is what 
the next paragraphs will attempt to analyze. 
). Indexations at play. 
The first consequence of indexations was to create an atmosphere 
of facility propitious to an increase in public expenses. Heretofore, 
Cabinets had been able to resist the demands of pressure groups by opposing 
to them the threat of inflationary deficits. Once these deficits could 
be covered by public loans, the threat of inflation apparently disappeared 
and the argument lost much of its value. As can be seen in Exhibit XIV, 
the volume of the budgetary 11 impasse 11 rose constantly from 1952 to 1957. 
So did the contribution of private savings .to its financing until it was 
discovered, in 1957, that there was after all a limit to the receptivity 
of the bond-market . By that time, it had also become evident, that public 
loans were not altogether neut~al from the financial point of view. It is 
interesting to comment upon the ideas expressed on this subject by M. Pierre 
Berger in an article entitled: 11 Is the impact of public loans deflationary 
or inflationary?" 
a . Inflationary impact of public loans. 
The author begins by making it clear that, in the present 
circumstances -- meaning the misuse being made of the 11 impasse 11 -- the 
program of public expenses and the proportion of it that will be financed 
through taxation are determined before the decision of floating a Loan is 
taken. The Loan itself has, therefore, no direct influence upon the volume 
of State expenses except for the fact that its success may be an incentive 
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to increase them. M. Berger then analyzes the impact of public loans upon 
money supply. 
It is generally admitted, he says, that those who subscribe 
to a State Loan do so with hoarded funds. These funds, which had not been 
destined for consumption uses would thus support a new current of demand 
in the commodities market -- when used by theGovernment to finance its 
expenses -- and thus exert an inflationary pressure upon the price struc-
ture . M. Berger does not entirely agree with this theory, however, and 
thinks that the inflationary impact of a State Loan depends on the nature 
of the funds used to subscribe to it and also on the use the Treasury will 
make of the borrowed funds. 
It is true, says the author, that investors will not curtail 
their current consumption expenditures to subscribe to a loan; but they 
may very well postpone the purchase of some durable goods, the replacement 
of a car, of a T.V. set, etc. Thus, the increase in Government expenditures 
financed with the proceeds of the loan is, to some extent, offset by a 
decrease in private demand. Moreover , subscribers are later obliged to 
save more in order to rebuild their contingency balances to the desired 
level. 
When the investor subscribes to the loan with gold , it is 
the Bank of France which pays the funds to the Treasury through the creation 
of new francs. In this case, it seems that the subscription is entirely 
inflationary in its consequences. But, says M. Berger: first the Government 
expenses financed with the proceeds of the loan would have been incurred 
anyway and would have been financed through an advance from the Ban_k of 
France, that is to say, through a creation of new francs; second, it is 
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probable that the creation of new francs resulting from the sales of gold 
to the Bank of France avoids the creation of francs in other ways and 
especially by means of credit granted to business enterprises. M. Berger 
is then able to conclude: 
0 These various considerations show that, al-
though the issue of a State Loan must not 
be considered as free from inflationary 
tendencies, •••• , it produces reactions 
which annihilate these tendencies and even 
provoke a certain contraction in private 
demand, present and future. Weighting the 
various factors which exert an influence one 
way or the other, one is obliged to conclude 
that public borrowing is a useful tool to be 
used to attenuate the tensions arising from 
the budgetary deficit."• 
This reasoning is, of course, unimpeachable, considering 
the premises from which the author starts, i.e. that if the loan is not 
floated, Government expenses will have to be financed through bank credit. 
But is it entirely reassuring to know that a State Loan is not quite as 
inflationary as a direct advance from the Bank of France? We are far, 
in reality, from the optimistic view which considers the financing of public 
expenses through debt as financially neutral. 
One may even wonder if M. Berger's views as to the deflationary 
impace of public borrowing are not too optimistic at least as far as the 
French experience of the years 1952-1958 is concerned. 
The author's contention is that subscription to a Loan will 
oblige investors to postpone their purchases of durable goods . ·This can 
be true only if installment credit is strictly rationed by the Government 
and it seems that French financial policies were not severe enough to en-
* 7, p.484 
'' 
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force this effective reduction of private consumption. 1956 was a year 
of heavy public borrowing and should have been a year of lower private 
expenditures on durable goods . But, in spite of a Decree of August 4, 
1956 establishi:pg minimum doi'm payments of 25% and maximum repayment periods 
* of 18 months, the National Credit Council estimated total installment 
credit outstanding at the end of 1956 at f.l66 billions, 29 billions above 
** its volume at the end of 1955• Thus , from 1952 to 1955, when no credit 
control existed , and even in 1956, after it had been instituted, install-
ment loans were able to offset, at least partially, the deflationary effect 
of public borrowing on the volume of purchasing power outstanding. 
In 1957, down payments had to be raised to 35% and the 
maximum repayment period was reduced to 15 months. By the beginning of 
1958, these drastic measures were criticized as threatening recession at 
a time when most European countries were alarmed by the slackening of their 
economic activity. It would be easy to brush aside these criticisms as 
selfish reactions of some particular interests, but they are worth analyz-
ing to find whatever truth they may be in them. One cannot doubt the 
necessity of reducing private demand in the market in order to make room 
for increased public expenditures. But this reduction has to be selective, 
otherwise it may do more harm than good . The theory according to which 
any ~ecrease in private expenditures will offset the inflationary impact 
of any increase in public expenses seems objectionable; it would be true 
in an economy where labor and production facilities could be shifted at 
* 10, p. h.Bo 
** 18, p 360 . 
will from one ~se to another. In a highly specialized economy, however, 
indiscriminate credit control may cause underemployment and recession 
in one sector without any noticeable effect of the inflationary pressures 
evident in other sectors. A curtailment of the production of private cars, 
for example, will not permit any increase in the construction of dams, at 
least not in the short run. Unless the shift takes place over a period 
of time, the only result will be to create unemployment and distress in 
the car industry. In other words, public borrowing will not have an immediate 
stabilizing influence unless it reduces private consumption in the ·sectors 
of the economy where public and private demand compete. 
M. Berger gives some thought to this factor when he stops, 
for one moment speaking in terms of the overall supply and demand; and 
declares: 
" Moreover, because it facilitates an increase 
in public expenditures, public borrowing may 
increase the overall demand. • ••• However, it 
may also stimulate production and, consequently, 
supply in certain sectors of the economy where 
full employment has not yet been attained. 0 
Once again, the remark does not seem to apply· to the French 
economy of the years 1952-1958 where employment was maintained at peak 
levels. With an average of 400,000 to 500,000 young men of working age 
retained in the army for the pacification of Algeria, France has suffered 
more from a shortage than from an excess of manpower. In the year 1957, 
the total number of workers receiving unemployment relief was of 18,000* 
among which 9,500 only were under 60 years of age. The weekly average of 
hours worked was of 46 hours. There was little hope that increased Govern-
* 19, P• 12 
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ment expenditures may boost production in any sector of the economy. 
Even if one admits that Government borrowing results in 
reduction of private deman, it is necessary to· stress the fact ' that this 
reduction is only temporary since Government expenditures will promptly 
pump back into the income circuit the funds that had been withdra~m. In-
asmuch as the funds will have been shifted from high-income income groups 
\-lith a low marginal propensity to consume, to lo\-ler-income income groups 
with a higher marginal propensity to consume, the overall impact of the 
operation will be to increase private consumption instead of reducing it. 
In short, \>Te must conclude that, even when covered by public 
loans, budgetary deficits exerted inflationary pressures upon the French 
economy . By facilitating the raising of private funds and, at the same 
time, encouraging the increase of public expenditures, indexations were, 
in fact, contributing to inflation. 
At the same time, the volume and frequency of public issues 
weakened the bond-market and prevented the fall of the interest rate . The 
rate of' interest which must be offered on aparticular issue depends on 
the market yield of similar issues. It had been hoped that the use of 
indexations would cause a drop in these yields by increasing the demand 
for fixed-income securities . The demand for bonds did increase, but the 
supply increased also due t o the increase of' both public and private issues . 
The yields remained practically unchan~ed. In 1956 most private issues 
still carried interest rates of 6% although they were issued at substantial 
discounts . S .• N .c .F., Electrici te de France, and other nationalized in-
dustries issued bonds carrying interest rates of 5%, 5i% or even 6%. With 
the National Loan of 1956, the Government was offering 5% on an indexed issue . 
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b . Inflationary effects of bank credit 
Private borrowers were not, however, discouraged by the 
high cost of borrowing and went on investing at an accelerated pace . Well 
protected against foreign competition by tarifts, quotas, .etc . they merely 
passed on to the consumer the increased cost of their financing . The 
volume of their bond issues increased from f .7 billions in 1952 to f .88 
billions in 1955 and f .74 billions in 1956 . At the same time, the inter-
mediate-term loans they obtained f rom commercial banks were rediscounted 
by the Bank of France . The evolution of the monetary equation since 1950 
shows that, from 1952 to 1956 -- years of "stabilization" -- the money 
supply increased from f .4,287 billions to f .6,817 billions . The budget 
deficit having been more or less covered by bo~d issues, banks 1 holdings 
of Government paper were kept almost stable in volume; business firms, 
however, were able to obtain from the same banking system the funds they 
could not find in the bond-market -- and more --. 
From December )1, 1955 to December )1, 1956 the rediscount 
portfolio of the Bank of France increa~ed from f .619 . ) billions to f.l,0)6 
• billions; these rediscount operations were financed through inflationary 
issues of new francs which permitted the banking system to increase its 
loans to the economy by f.l , ll6 bi~lions in one year . Veiled to the eyes 
of the public -- inasmuch as business credit is les s closely watched than 
credit to the Government - - French i nfl ation was nonetheless progre ssing 
at a r apid pace . Once more speculation on the fall of the franc appeared 
and, after 1956, aggravated the financial situation. Industrial and business 
* 11 Annuaire Statist:ique de la France 11 • 1957 • 
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~irma began to increase their inventories, thereby accelerating in~lation 
inside the country and aggravating the balance o~ trade deficit. French 
industry was pricing itself' out of foreign markets . Able to find credit 
with their banks, the few ~irms which could export, postponed the repatria-
tion of their foreign exchange, waiting for a devaluation of the franc . 
In fact, a 20% devaluation was carried out on August 10, 1957; the rate 
of exchange in relation to the dollar increased from f.)50 to f.420 . The 
Government tried to check inflation by a very strict credit ~olicy; the 
limitations placed on installment credit have already been mentioned. 
Other measures were taken concerning the rediscount operations of the Bank 
of France. The rediscount rate was raised the fi rst time from ?% to 4% 
(April 11, 1957), then to 5% (August 12, 1957) • Rediscount "ceilings" 
were lowered by 10% on July 10 , by another 10% on August 10, again by 15% 
on November 26. On April 18, 1958, the penalization rate for rediscounts 
above the ceilings were raised from 7 to 8% for the first "tranche 11 (10% 
above ceiling) from 10 to 12% for the second 11 tranche 11 (over the preceding 
** limi~). All these measures could not put a stop to the run against the 
franc . None of them, in fact, could solve the problem and France was 
drifting unavoidably towards bankruptcy . In April of 1958, all foreign 
exchange reserves were once more exhausted and the Government was obliged 
to solicit foreign loans or to discontinue its payments. The years of 
11stabilization 11 ended up in a diss.ster. 
One cannot attribute to the ef~ect of indexations alone the 
situation in which France ~ound hersel~ in April, 1958. The real causes 
** 10, P• 706 
• 
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of inflation lay in the rapid development of the French economy to which 
were added the expenses incurred in the Algerian war. The Cabinets of 
the Fourth Republic lacked the power to deal efficiently with the Algerian 
problem, and could only face the expenses it brought about. As for the 
development of the economy, considering the projected European Common 
Market, it was, in the eyes of many experts, a primordial objective which 
outweighted all considerations of monetary stability. Thus, if we admit 
that all the expenditures incurred were desirable or, at least, unavoidable, 
we may conclude that inflation also could hardly be avoided . However, the 
use of indexations certainly contribut~d to aggravate the f inal crisis by 
masking the slow degradation ~f the financial situation and allowing it 
to continue until it came to the bursting point. 
Inflation meaning, in this case, the loss of purchasing 
power of the currency -- is not merely the sign of a disequilibrium. It 
is, at the same time, an automatic stabilizer which redistributes purchasing 
power throughout the economy and forces "savings" upon some to balance 
the excess of investments of others . However, inflation cannot play its 
part as a stabilizer if it is not allowed to carry out this redistribution. 
One cannot attribute to indexations a lone the situation in 
which France found herself at the beginning of 1958. The real causes of 
inflation lay in the rapid development of the French economy and in the 
military operations in Algeria . Although it could have progressed at a 
more reasonable pace, economic development was necessary to prepare France 
to joi n the European Common Market; as fortheAl gerian problem, the Cabinets 
of the Fourth Republic lacked the power to deal with it eff iciently and 
could only postpone its solution while paying for the expenses war entailed . 
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Admitting that economic investments were desirable and military expenditures, 
unavoidable, one must conclude that inflation would have occurred even in 
the absence of indexations. The ~roblem is to determine whether the use 
of indexations did not aggravate the final crisis by masking the slow 
degradation of the financial situation and allowing it to continue until 
it came to the bursting point. 
The policy of indexations had "put up token resistance to 
• depreciation of monetary values". The real causes of inflation had re-
mained; they lay in the excess of bank credit which created a disequilibrium 
between the money supply and the volume of goods available. The rediscount-
ing of intermediate-term commercial paper by the Bank of France, the 
11 advances 11 of this same Bank to the Treasury corresponded to what Schumpeter 
calls 11abnormal credit". They created purchasing pOl"l'er 11 out of nothing'', 
purchasing power which did not correspond, at least for the time being, 
to any increase in the total stock of goods or factors of production . 
Because the French economy was already working at full capacity, this 
increase in the money supply could only result in a general price rise. 
The depreciation of the currency -- sometimes referred to 
as inflation by a public which mistakes the effect for the cause -- is an 
essential element of the inflationary process. It operates, in a sense, 
as an automatic stabilizer inasmuch as it tends, through redistribution of 
purchasing power, to restore the balance between supply and demand on the 
commodities market. \~orkers in their wages, industrialists and peasants 
in their sales revenues, rentiers in their income, retired persons in their 
* 71 
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pensions and life annuities bear the expense of the operation. Inflation 
forces "savings 11 upon them, and these savings liberate enough purchasing 
power to finance new investments or the deficit of the budget. One class 
of income recipients may resist better than others to the erosion of its 
income, thereby avoiding its share of the common burden; but somebody has 
to suffer a loss, somewhere in the economy; purchasing power has to be 
liberated to honour the newly created monetary units. 
The problem French Governments had to face .after 1952 was 
precisely that there was no category of income recipients left from which 
purchasing power could be substracted. All of them had succeeded so well 
in consolidating their position that new monetary issues met, so to speak, 
with a vacuum. Every section of the population had equipped itself with 
its own sliding scale: sliding scale of wages, indexed on the cost-of-
living index; sliding scale of agricultural prices, support prices were 
indexed on the price of products and services .used by farmers . From the 
moment the rentier, traditional victim of inflation, received a guaranty 
against the depreciation of his capital, inflation had nothing to feed on. 
A situation had been created where the slightest change in any part of the 
economy could start a t~ve of spiralling inflation; a single bad crop, 
by raising agricultural prices, could case a permanent increase in the 
minimum salary; since most labour unions had obtained that the raise in 
the minimum wage be reflected in the entire wage structure so as to pre-
serve the hierarchy, a general wage rise would inevitably follow . Well 
protected against foreign competition, producers would not hesitate to 
raise their prices, shifting to the consumer the increased labor cost; these 
price rises would cause increases in farm support prices, in the burden 
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of a ll indexed debt, in the cost-of-living index and again in wages, 
etc. 
The State budget was the only element that kept some measure 
of elasticity in this ossified structure. It became the shock absorber 
for all the jerks of the · economy and, for some time, managed to amortize 
through "economic subsidies" some of the price increases which may· have 
precipitated the inflationary process . The budget for 1959 as it was 
originally projected, befqre the Government of General Charles de Gaulle 
operated the necessary reforms included f.46) billions of such subsidies 
(out of f .5,717 billions of budgetary expenses): f.56 billions of farm 
subs idies and f.2) billions of subsidies to industry to keep agricultural 
and industrial prices down; f.57.6 billions of expo rt subsidies to enable 
French industry to compete on foreign markets, thereby improving the balance 
of trade and putting the brake on the rapid external depreciation of the 
franc and on the loss of gold and foreign exchange; f.29.7 billions of 
subsidies to keep down the price of several commodities incorporated in 
the consumer price index and avoid a rise in the minimum salary. (In 1958, 
chocolate, for example, was paid only at 73% of its real value by the 
consumer, the other 27% being paid out of the budget). f.l96 billions of 
subsidies to transportation companies: Air France and French Line -- to 
keep them competitive in the international market -- French Railways, to 
avoid the effect a rate increase would have had on their debt burden and 
on the cost-of-living index; for the same reasons, f.51 billions were 
allotted to the French coal mines and f .50 billions to the building industry. 
The same desire to avoid price rises and the \rorking of indexations obliged 
to keep down postal and telephone rates and the rates of electricity. These 
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two fast-growing industries were thus ~revented f rom financing their 
01~ investments through retained earnings and the State budget had to 
contribute a total of f.lOO billions for this purpose. 
Inflation, this fiscal system of weak Governments, was not 
taxing anybody any longer; on the contrary, it had a boomerang effect as 
every new monetary issue came back to the State budget in the form of an 
increased deficit. It was clear that the fragile barrier thus set up by 
the Government against inflation could not hold the tide in check for ever; 
sooner or later, a general clean up would become necessary to free the 
economy from the distortions to which it had been subjected, destroy the 
ossification of French economic structures and render them the elasticity 
without whichthere is no progress possible. The more Governments postponed 
this day of reckoning, the more they feared its consequences; the only 
solution lay in a policy which would reduce the expenditures of the State 
and increase its revenues; but, how could t his be done without imposing 
sacrifices upon the Nation, without destroying the barriers behind which 
every category of citizens had thought it would protect its own 11 situation 
acquise 11 7 Lacking the political strength to impose the necessary reforms, 
the Cabinets of the Fourth Republic found themselves at a deadlock. 
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Conclusion 
A financial crisis and the threat of a civil war were 
necessary to pull France out of this impasse. The events of ~~y, 1958, 
which brought General de Gaulle back to pO'I'7er, and the subsequent re-
organization of French institutions at last ~roduced a Government endowed 
with enough powers to carry out the reforms which so many of its ':>redecessors 
had vainly attempted to ~romote . 
On December 28, 1958, General de Gaulle, in an address to 
the Nation, announced the financial measures adopted by his Cabinet and 
intended to 11eatablish the country on a basis of verity and severity" . * 
Prepared by a Committee of Financial Experts and outlined in a re~ort known 
as the 11 Rueff Report 11 -- by the name of the General Inspector of Finance 
who headed the Committee - these measures were the following: 
The reform consecrated the budgetary distinction between 
the current expenses of State services andthe productive investments of 
** 11 economic services 11 • 
The budget of current expenses would be strictly balanced: 
expenses would be reduced by the ending of subsidies to producers ( 11verity 11 ) 
and a reorganization of the State services . Revenues would be increased 
through tax increases ( 11 severity 11 ) and a reform of the taxation system. 
The budget of investments would be financed through public 
borrowings. On the basis of household savings amounting to f . l,545 billions 
in 1958 , financial experts estimated that the 11 possibility for the Treasury 
to issue real Loans, financed through savings and not through credit in-
* 
** 
16, P• 1 
9, P• 555 
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flation remained somewhat below f .600 billions • 11 The volume of Govern-
ment borrowings >-tould be kept at 50% of this amount so as to avoid the 
overestimates current under the regime of the impasse and, at the same 
time, allow private firms a share in the bond market . 
All investment expenses financed through public funds would 
be financed directly by the Treasury so as to avoid the rediscount of loans 
by the Bank of France . As for the intermediate-term loans granted by banks 
to private firms, their rediscount would remain subject to all the limitations 
established during 1956 and 1957 (see Chapter V) . 
The Coill)llittee did not i gnore the danger that some of the 
projected measures mi ght cause a new wave of inflation. The ending of 
subsidies , the increase in taxes and the devaluation of the currency would 
cause price increases which would tend to be reflected in wages and other 
incomes through the working of indexation clauses . To guard a gainst this 
danger , a double set of measures were taken ' 
I nternational trade was decontrolled by abolition of 90% 
of all quota restrictions and the f ranc revalued at a parity in keeping 
with the level of pr ices in France . In addition, France moved with European 
countries to allow freer convertibility of the franc abroad . This action 
would , in itself;·express confidence in the new policy. At the same time, 
the Commit tee expected that the liberalization of trade would "exert an 
effective pressure on prices, necessary at a time when they would be affected 
* by the projected reforms" . 
The Government also decided to "abolish a series of these 
indexations which are nothing, in reality, but proclamations of diffidence 
* 1) , P• 2 
-139-
** towards the currency11 • The minimum wage rate would remain linked to 
the cost-of-living index but a decree would declare the indexation of any 
other salary illegal. A price rise affecting the minimum wage rate would 
thus remain \'li thout effect upon the rest of the wage structure . The 
indexation of agricultural prices .\>rould be revised so as to take into 
account the variations in the volume of production. 
As for indexed bonds, alth Jugh they fell under the common 
reprobation attached to clauses of automatic variability, nothing was 
changed in their status: at a time when the Government was striving to 
re-create confidence an·d strengthen the bond market, it was naturally 
impossible to deprive the bondholders of the guaranties which had been 
granted. Moreover, from the day indexations had ceased to be generalized, 
they became less dangerous . No new issues will be floated, however, and 
it is probable that the Treasury and other public borrowers will hasten 
the retirement of the outstanding issu~s or refund them with bonds of a 
classic type . 
As for private issues , the use of participating and con-
vertible features remains tolerated -- de \1endell & Oie floated an issue 
of participating bonds in April , 1959 -- but it has lost its inflationary 
potentialities in a competitive economy open to outside influences . The 
necessity of maintaining their position in the market will prevent borrowers 
from shifting their costs of financing to consumers . Besides, it is probable 
that such guaranty clauses will tend to disappear naturally as monetary 
stability and r enewed confidence strengthen the n:iarket. 
** 19 , !> • 4 
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50. 
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Electricite de France. Parts de Production 1952, a in-
teret et capital indexes sur le prix moyen du Kw/h 
Electricite de France . Parts de production 1953, a in-
teret et capital indexes sur le prix moyen du Kw/h 
Electricite de France. Parts de prmduction 1954, a in-
teret et capital indexes sur le prix mQyen du Kw/h 
Electricite de France. Obligations 6% 1957, a capital 
majore d•une prime indexee sur !•augmentation de la pro-
,duction d'electricite. 
Electricite de France; parts 1958 a interet et capital~­
dexes sur le prix moyen du Kw/h 
S. N. C.F. Bons indexes 1953 a 15 ans, a interet et capital 
indexes sur la base du prix kilometrique des billets voya-
geurs ou payables en coupons de transport. 
S. N. C.F. Bons indexes 1954, 6% min. assortis de dispositions 
semblables . 
S. N. C.F. Bans indexes 1956, 5~ min. assortis de dispositions 
semblables. 
S.N.C.F . Bons indexes 1957, 5!% min, assortis de disposi-
tions semblables . 
Regie Renault. Obligations 5~ 1955, interet et capital in-
dexes sur le chiffre d 1affaire. 
Regie Renault . Obligations 6% 1957, id. 
Groupement de 11Industrie .Siderurgique. Obligations 6% 1957 
a capital et interet variables en fonction du chiffre 
d•affaire forfaitire de l'Industrie Siderurgique . 
Groupement de l 1industrie Siderurgique . Obligations 6% 1957 
et 1958 identiques. 
Pechiney. Obligations 5~ 1953 a interet et capital varia-
bles avec les dividendes bruts verses au capital action. 
Union Siderurgique Lorraine Sidelor . Obligations 6% 1958 
avec bonification supplementaire en interet et capital va-
riable avec l•accroissement des dividendes et des sommes 
portees en reserve . 
G. I . C.E . L. Obligations 6% 1954 avec bonification supplemen-
taire en interet et capital variable avec 1 1 augmentation 
du chiffre d•affaire global des industries de la construc-
tion electrique. 
Societe Anonyme Andre Citroen. Obligations 6% 1954 a inte-
ret supplementaire et prime de remboursement variables avec 
l•accroissement des dividendes at des sommes portees en re-
serve . 
Societe Anonyme Andre Citroen. Obligations 5t% 1955, id. 
Societe Anonyme Andre Citroen. Obligations 5!% 1956, id. 
De Wendell et Cie, S.A. Obligations 6% 1954 variables avec 
1 1accroissement des dividendes et des sommes portees en 
reserve . 
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51. Societe d ' Electrametallurgie et des Acieries Electriques 
d 1Ugine. Obligations 6% 1957 avec' bonification supplemen-
taire variable avec l 1accroissement des dividendes et des 
sommes portees en reserve . 
52 . S.E. I . C. H. I .M.E . Obligations 4% convertibles en actions 
53 . Simca; obligations 5t% 1956 variables avec l'accroissement 
des dividendes et des sommes portees en reserve a l 1excep -
tion de la reserve legale . 
54. Organico . Obligations 5% 1956 convertibles en actions . 
55. saviem.L. R. S. Obligations 5% 1956 avec bonification supple-
mentaire en interet et capital . 
56. Con:pagnie Generale de Telegraphie sans fil . Obligations 3% 
1957 convertibles en actions . 
IV . Personal Sources of information 
Unpublished materiel made available by the economics depart-
ment of the Banque de Paris et des P~s Bas. 
57. Les emprunts etrangers indexes sur le prix d'un produit. 
Etudes Economiques • 5 Nov . 1958. 
58 . Les Emprunts indexes de la S.N.C.F. Tarifs voyageurs , in-
teret et prix de remboursement payes jusqu'a ce jour . 
59 . Le s Emprunts Indexes de Gaz de France. 
60 . Les Emprunts indexes d 1electricite de France . Prix moyen 
du Kw/h et pri de remboursement payes jusqu 1a ce jour. 
. 61. Cour.s de 1 1 or a Paris du 31 Mars 19 52 au 31 Mars 1959. 
62 . ·~ Liste des Emprunts indexes emis en France depuis 1952 . 
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1950 pp . 257- 3JO . 
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65. 
66. 
67 . 
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J~ 4, 1957. 
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New York Times 
70. Hefferman. Bond yield puzzle . October 16, 1958. 
71. Report behind French reforms issued here to fight Infla-
tion. May 6, 1959. 
72 . France displays fiscal optimism. May 15 1959. 
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